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Credit loss modelling under IFRS standards has changed towards a more forward-looking approach. 
The new expected credit loss model allows using all relevant information that is available without 
undue cost, also forward-looking information. Macroeconomic factors provide this kind of easily 
available information and thus they can be utilized in the credit loss modelling. Hence, I apply a large 
set of macroeconomic variables in order to find those ones that help to estimate future credit losses. 
Bank-specific features are also likely to affect credit loss changes, so they are also considered in this 
thesis.  
 
On a sample of 24 European countries and 202 banks, I examine the explanatory power of changes in 
macroeconomic variables on consequent credit losses. The empirical analysis is based on several 
pooled, fixed effects and logistic regression specifications. I also use stepwise regressions based on 
Akaike information criteria to select a set of relevant variables in the multivariate regression 
specification. 
 
The univariate regression results suggest that important macroeconomic variables explaining the 
changes in credit losses of the following year are the house price index, gross fixed capital formation, 
the nominal long-term interest rate and the term spread. Based on the multivariate regression results, 
inflation, unemployment and bankruptcies are the most important macroeconomic variables and bank 
size is the most important bank-specific variable. Small banks typically suffer from greater credit loss 
increases than medium and large banks, but medium and large banks are more sensitive to economic 
fluctuations. In addition, commercial banks are more sensitive to the changes in the house price index 
and unemployment than savings banks whereas savings banks are more sensitive to the changes in the 
number of bankruptcies. 
 
The results documented have valuable implication for the practical implementation of the credit loss 
models and estimating future credit losses. The findings can be especially exploited in European 
banks that follow IFRS standards and apply the expected credit loss model. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Credit loss modelling of banks showed its importance at the latest during the financial 
crisis of 2008. Credit losses are defined as the losses made by a bank arising from 
loans that are not repaid. The idea of the credit loss modelling is to recognize credit 
loss allowances in order to reflect future expected credit losses. Poorly implemented 
credit loss modelling can lead to overstatements of a bank’s financial assets and 
prevents the timely information of the assets to flow to the financial markets (Barth & 
Landsman, 2010; Camfferman, 2015). Overstatements make the financial health of a 
bank look distorted. When an economy is in a recession, it is likely that these 
overstatements will backfire as credit losses start to increase, but insufficient 
allowances are made. This affects the profitability of a bank. The financial crisis 
showed the worst scenario of the consequences of overstatements and too low levels 
of allowances.  
The credit loss modelling is a means to reflect credit risk through credit loss 
allowances. If credit risk is inaccurately estimated, it can have severe consequences, 
such as foster financial crises. It has been stated that credit risk was the major cause of 
the financial crisis of 2008 and of the European debt crisis (Gebhardt, 2016.) During 
the financial crisis, the incurred credit loss model of the accounting standard IAS 39 
was applied. One of its major drawbacks was that it led to a delayed credit loss 
recognition. Due to the need for improvements in accounting standards, International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) started to work for the common accounting principles (Financial Crisis 
Advisory Group, 2009). However, the cooperation was challenging and eventually 
IASB issued IFRS 9, that includes the expected credit loss model, without FASB in 
2014 (IASB, 2014). 
IFRS standards are largely used in Europe and thus, also the expected credit loss 
model, effective since 2018, is applied in many European banks. The new expected 
credit loss model allows using all relevant information that is available without undue 
cost, also forward-looking information (IASB, 2014.) The aim is to avoid a delayed 
recognition of credit losses which was a problem with the IAS 39 incurred credit loss 
model (Barth & Landsman, 2010).  
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Macroeconomic factors are easily available information that provide also forward-
looking information. Thus, they can be exploited in the credit loss modelling. This 
study covers an extensive set of macroeconomic factors that are possible predictors of 
future credit losses. The aim is to identify which of them are useful in the expected 
credit loss modelling for banks in Europe. Thus, the first research question that I aim 
to tackle is: which macroeconomic factors are important for the credit loss modelling 
in European banks? The bank-specific features may also have an impact on the 
changes in credit losses and thus, are also considered. Especially, I want to examine 
whether bank size has an impact on the changes in credit losses. Thus, the second and 
third research questions are: are there differences between banks with different size 
and do other bank-specific features matter in estimating future credit losses? It is also 
interesting to examine whether there are differences between the credit loss changes 
in savings and commercial banks. The fourth research question is: does it matter 
whether a bank is a commercial or a savings bank in estimating the future credit losses? 
Macroeconomic factors reflect the state of an economy. Thus, they also reflect the 
systematic banking credit risk (Castro, 2013). Several studies find a relation between 
macroeconomic factors, defaults and credit risk. For instance, Kalirai and Scheicher 
(2002) study the relation between credit risk through credit loss allowances and 
macroeconomic factors in Austrian banks and find that industrial production, stock 
market, the short-term interest rate and business confidence affect credit loss 
allowances. Virolainen (2004) examines the possible macroeconomic factors 
determining the corporate sector default rates in Finland and finds that GDP, interest 
rates and corporate indebtedness have a significant relation with corporate defaults. 
Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) study credit risk and macroeconomic factors in Czech 
Republic and Germany and find variables that determine credit risk in both countries. 
Defaults and credit risk are closely related to credit losses. Thus, they should have the 
same determinants, such as certain macroeconomic factors. Prior literature of the 
relation between macroeconomic factors, defaults and credit risk is reviewed in detail 
in section 3. 
The macroeconomic factors considered in this study are mainly based on the studies 
by Boss (2002) and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) who divide macroeconomic factors 
into distinct groups. The groups in this study are cyclical indicators, price stability 
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indicators, private sector indicators, stock market indicators, interest rate indicators 
and other indicators. Cyclical indicators are real GDP and industrial production. Price 
stability indicators include inflation, narrow money (M1) and the house price index. 
Stock market variables are the STOXX Europe 600 index, and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIND) index. Interest rate indicators include short- and long-term 
nominal and real interest rates and the term spread. Other indicators are exports and 
the exchange rate. 
Bank-specific variables included are inefficiency, leverage, solvency, size and 
profitability. Prior literature indicates that these bank-specific variables have a relation 
with non-performing loans and hence, they should have a relation with credit losses. 
For instance, Berger and DeYoung (1997) explain the relation between non-
performing loans and inefficiency in U.S. commercial banks whereas Chaibi and Ftiti 
(2015) study the determinants of non-performing loans including both macroeconomic 
and bank-specific variables in France and Germany similarly as Louzis, Vouldis and 
Metaxas (2012) in the Greek banking sector. In addition to inefficiency, leverage, 
solvency, size and profitability, I also examine whether a type of a bank i.e. whether a 
bank is a savings or a commercial bank, matters or not. Salas and Saurina (2002) study 
credit risk in Spanish commercial and savings banks and find that non-performing 
loans are more sensitive to the business cycles in commercial banks than in savings 
banks. Hence, it is expected that credit losses are also more sensitive to the 
macroeconomic factors in commercial banks than in savings banks. 
Data consists of the annual time-series data of macroeconomic variables for 24 
European countries and bank-specific variables for 202 European banks. The sample 
period covers 14 years from 2005 to 2018. The macroeconomic variables are retrieved 
from the OECD database expect the stock market indicators which are from the 
Worldscope database. The bank-specific variables are also retrieved from the 
Worldscope. Data is described in detail in section 5.  
The empirical analysis is based on several pooled, fixed effects and logistic regression 
specifications. I also use stepwise regressions to find relevant variables for the 
multivariate regression specifications because selecting right explanatory variables 
manually from the large set of explanatory variables is difficult. All macroeconomic 
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variables cannot be not included in the same multivariate model because some of them 
are highly correlated. However, if an important variable is omitted from the regression, 
there is a danger that estimated coefficients of included variables and the intercept 
become biased and inconsistent. This leads to biased forecasts and inappropriate 
inferences (Brooks, 2014, p. 179.) However, including highly correlated variables in 
the same regression can lead a situation where multicollinearity is present (Brooks, 
2014, pp. 170–171). If there is perfect multicollinearity, all coefficients cannot be 
estimated. If there is a near multicollinearity, coefficients will have high standard 
errors, the regression is sensitive to small changes and the confidence intervals are 
wide. Consequently, the significance tests might yield incorrect inferences (Brooks, 
2014, p. 172.) Thus, it is justifiable to exclude some of the macroeconomic variables 
from the multivariate regression to avoid multicollinearity in the model. Methods are 
described in detail in section 6. 
Results are represented in section 7. Based on the univariate regression results the 
house price index, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), the nominal long-term 
interest rate and the term spread are important determinants of the credit loss changes 
of the following year. The results suggest that the change in the house price index and 
the change in GFCF are negatively related to the change in credit losses. Both the 
change in the nominal long-term interest rate and the change in the term spread have 
positive relation with the change in credit losses. This is intuitive because interest rates 
and the term spread represent the borrowing costs (Ang, Gorovyy, & Van Inwegen, 
2011; Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). 
The multivariate linear regression results suggest that inflation and unemployment 
have the strongest effects on credit loss changes for the following year. However, the 
coefficients of these variables are to some extent contradictory with prior literature. 
Inflation has a positive relation with credit losses that might arise from the decrease of 
the real income of households and companies. Unemployment growth has a negative 
relation with credit loss changes. This can be due to the high correlation of 
unemployment with GDP and bankruptcies in the same multivariate model, but it can 
also indicate that banks might grant fewer loans because the number of people that are 
eligible for a loan is decreased and consequently the credit losses decrease too. 
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Based on the multivariate logistic regression results, the growing number of 
bankruptcies increases the most the probability to an extreme credit loss increase to 
occur. Typically, the corporate loans are bigger than the loans of households and 
hence, the result is intuitive. If a company defaults, it is likely that credit losses increase 
considerably. Logistic regression results also suggest that medium solvency banks are 
more likely to face extreme credit loss decreases than low solvency banks. 
The results suggest that bank size is an essential variable to explain credit loss changes. 
Small banks typically suffer from greater increases in credit losses compared to 
medium and large banks whereas credit losses of medium and large banks are more 
sensitive to the changes in macroeconomic factors. The possible explanation is that 
larger banks operate also in foreign countries and hence, they are more exposed to 
economic fluctuations. In addition, credit losses of commercial banks are more 
sensitive to the changes in house prices and unemployment than savings banks. 
Commercial banks are also less likely to face extreme credit loss decreases. However, 
credit losses of savings banks are more sensitive to the changes in the number 
bankruptcies. 
As well as in this thesis, some prior studies consider both macroeconomic and bank-
specific variables, but those studies concentrate typically on a few European countries. 
This thesis covers 24 European countries and hence, contributes prior literature. The 
set of macroeconomic variables is also extensive, and the aim is to identify those 
variables that are useful in estimating the credit losses for the following year. The 
results documented have valuable implication for the implementation of credit loss 
models and estimating the future credit losses. This is because IFRS 9 has been 
effective only since 2018, so it is likely that there is still a need for the improvements 
of banks’ expected credit loss models. The findings can be especially exploited in 
European banks that follow IFRS standards. 
The study proceeds as follows. Prior literature is presented in sections 2, 3 and 4. 
Section 2 focuses on the credit loss modelling of banks, section 3 reviews the existing 
literature related to macroeconomic factors and their possible relation with credit 
losses and the focus of section 4 is on the bank-specific variables and credit losses. 
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The data and the methodology are described in sections 5 and 6 respectively. The 
research results are presented in section 7 and lastly, section 8 concludes. 
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2 CREDIT LOSS MODELLING IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
2.1 Why does credit loss modelling matter? 
Accounting standards require credit risk to be reflected in the financial statements 
through impairments of financial assets and credit loss allowances. These allowances 
reduce the net income and thus a bank’s equity (Gebhardt, 2016). However, too low 
levels of credit loss allowances will lead to overstatements of financial assets 
(Camfferman, 2015). Consequently, the financial health of a bank looks better than it 
is in reality. When an economy faces a downturn and the book value of financial asset 
differs from its market value, unexpected credit losses occur because they were not 
taken into account as allowances. This affects the profitability of a bank and endangers 
its capital adequacy. Hence, the forecasting of future credit losses is an important part 
of financial accounting in the banking sector. 
Barth and Landsman (2010) examine the role of financial reporting of banks in the 
financial crisis of 2008. They note that loans comprise a meaningful portion of the 
banks’ total assets and hence, the reporting of loan loss allowances is a critical 
component for the financial health in the banking industry. During the financial crisis, 
the IAS 39 incurred credit loss model was applied. Barth and Landsman (2010) note 
that the incurred credit loss model could have potentially deprived the markets of 
timely information of the value of bank assets, i.e. lead to delayed credit loss 
recognition. Thus, credit loss formation under IAS 39 has potentially contributed to 
the financial crisis (Barth & Landsman, 2010). 
Credit loss modelling during the financial crisis might have also led to procyclicality. 
According to the Financial Stability Forum (2009), procyclicality means the dynamic 
interactions between the financial and the real sectors of the economy and these 
interactions tend to amplify fluctuations in the economy and exacerbate financial 
instability because they are reinforcing each other. One of the shortages of the IAS 39 
incurred credit loss model was that the allowances for loan losses were recognized 
only in the case of a loss impairment (Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009). 
Consequently, the allowances increased during economic downturns leading to the 
decreasing profits of banks. Thus, banks were less willing to lend and tightened 
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lending for instance by increasing interests. This kind of banks’ behaviour might have 
led to a credit crunch, a sudden reduction in the general availability of loans, 
amplifying the downtrend even more (Adzis, Tripe & Dunmore, 2016; Wall & Koch, 
2000).  
It has also been stated that credit risk was the actual major cause of the financial crisis 
and of the European debt crisis (Gebhardt, 2016). As credit loss allowances reflect 
credit risk, credit loss modelling plays a crucial role to capture the right perception of 
credit risk. If the level of risk is understated, it can have severe consequences, as an 
extreme example, the financial crisis. All in all, the financial crisis showed that there 
was a real need for improvements in the credit loss model. 
2.2 Credit loss modelling in Europe 
The drawbacks of the IAS 39 incurred credit loss model motivated issuing the new 
IFRS 9 standard. The incurred credit loss model did not take account expected credit 
losses that were possible after the balance sheet date and the recognition of these credit 
losses was restricted to the situations where was objective evidence of a loss event. 
The additional expected credit losses took place in the next fiscal period (Camfferman, 
2015; Gebhardt, 2016.) Hence, the model led to a delayed credit loss recognition. 
Due to the shortages of the incurred credit loss model that revealed during the financial 
crisis, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) started to develop together converged solutions 
for the credit loss recognition (Financial Crisis Advisory Group, 2009). Finding a 
common solution was difficult, and hence the IASB and the FASB continued to 
develop their own credit loss models separately (IASB, 2011). Eventually, in July 
2014, the IASB issued the complete version of IFRS 9 Financial instruments, which 
has been effective since January 2018 (IASB, 2014). 
The credit loss modelling of banks in Europe follows largely IFRS standards because 
IFRS standards are required for domestic public companies and for listings by foreign 
companies in the European Union (IFRS Foundation, 2018). IFRS 9 contains the 
classification and measurements of financial assets, financial liabilities, and some 
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contracts to buy or sell non-financial items (IFRS Foundation, 2017). It also includes 
the expected credit loss (ECL) model which allows using all relevant information that 
is available without undue cost, including forward-looking information, to estimate the 
future credit losses (IFRS Foundation, 2014). Macroeconomic factors and bank-
specific characteristics provide this kind of useful and also forward-looking 
information and hence, they can be utilized to produce more accurate credit loss 
estimations.  
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3 MACROECONOMIC FACTORS AND CREDIT LOSSES 
Macroeconomic factors and their changes describe the state of the economy. 
According to Salas and Saurina (2002), problem loans are closely related to economic 
cycles – there are always macroeconomic factors behind every financial crisis. In 
addition, macroeconomic factors also reflect the systematic banking credit risk 
(Castro, 2013). 
Several studies focus on the macroeconomic determinants of defaults and credit risk. 
However, the relationship between default rates, credit risk and banks’ credit losses is 
obvious (Virolainen, 2004). Hence, it is justifiable to examine the same factors as 
determinants of credit losses as with defaults and credit risk. This study follows largely 
the categorization by Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss (2002): macroeconomic 
variables are divided into six groups which are cyclical indicators, price stability 
indicators, private sector indicators, stock market, interest rate indicators and other 
indicators. 
3.1 Cyclical indicators 
Cyclical indicators include the real GDP growth and industrial production. GDP is 
discovered to be an important macroeconomic determinant of credit risk fluctuations 
in the literature (Jiménez & Mencía, 2009). Typically, GDP is negatively related to 
loan losses and to the probability of default. During economic downturns when GDP 
growth is negative, borrowers are less likely to be able to pay back their liabilities 
whereas during upturns, when GDP growth is positive, the loan losses decrease 
(Kalirai & Sheicher, 2002.)  
According to Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), industrial production growth tends to lead 
to the GDP growth cycle. Hence, when industrial production increases, credit losses 
should decrease because the economy is growing. Kalirai and Scheicher find a 
negative relation between industrial production and credit loss allowances. Boss 
(2002) also finds that industrial production is an important determinant and has a 
negative relation with default rates. Thus, the relation between industrial production 
and credit losses is expected to be negative. 
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3.2 Price stability indicators 
Inflation, money supply and house prices are included as price stability indicators. 
Inflation has an ambiguous relation with credit losses. One could expect that inflation 
has a positive relation with credit losses because when the prices increase, the costs of 
production increase complicating the financial situation of firms. But for instance, 
Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) who study the effects of macroeconomic factors on 
credit risk in Czech Republic and Germany, find that inflation is negatively related to 
firms’ default rates in the Czech Republic. The reason is that inflation improves the 
financial situation of debtors in the short run because the real value of the debt 
obligation is decreased (Jakubik & Schmieder, 2008). 
On the other hand, inflation reduces the real income of households and firms (Chaibi 
& Ftiti, 2015). This will deteriorate their ability to repay debt and therefore increasing 
the probability of a credit loss to occur. For instance, Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006) find that inflation has a positive relation with non-performing loans. However, 
they also note that the expected relation is ambiguous. Thus, the relation between 
inflation and credit losses and is interesting to examine. 
Monetary aggregates, for instance M1, M2 and M3, measure the amount of money 
circulating in an economy. They are usually presented as end-of-month national 
currency stock series (OECD, 2012). Boss (2002) and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) 
include the monetary aggregate, narrow money (M1), in their studies. It consists of 
currency and overnight deposits circulating in an economy (OECD, 2012). Including 
M1 as a monetary aggregate is due to its potential relation with inflation (Kalirai & 
Scheicher, 2002). Both Boss (2002) and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) find that M1 is 
statistically significant in explaining credit risk. In both studies the relation between 
M1 and credit risk is negative and hence, the relation between M1 and credit losses 
should also be negative. Thus, if the amount of the currency and overnight deposits 
increases, credit losses should decrease. 
House prices also represent the price stability. Those banks that grant more mortgage 
loans may have higher exposure to housing prices. House prices might not affect only 
the defaults of households but also corporate defaults. Vlieghe (2001) examines 
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aggregate corporate default rate in the UK and finds that property prices are a 
significant determinant of corporate failures in the short run. This might be due to the 
important role of property as a collateral also in corporate loans. In the short-run, the 
coefficient is negative which means that as the property prices increase, the defaults 
decrease (Vlieghe, 2001.) Hence, the relation between house prices and credit losses 
could be negative. However, if the house prices increase, it also means that more debt 
is needed to buy a new house. Thus, the relation between house prices and credit losses 
might not be negative though, but positive if, for instance, the income level does not 
increase with the house prices. The consequence could be that banks grant larger loans 
but the ability to repay is not any better than before. 
3.3 Private sector indicators 
Private sector indicators include unemployment, household consumption, household 
income, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), bankruptcies and indebtedness of 
private sector. Unemployment reflects the state of households – unemployment affects 
the ability to repay debts (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). Hence, one could expect the 
relation between unemployment and credit losses to be positive. High unemployment 
occurs during bad economic states similarly as low output growth and low economic 
activity (Bali, Brown & Caglayan, 2014). Thus, it is likely that unemployment has a 
correlation with GDP. Virolainen (2004) finds that it is problematic to include 
unemployment rate because it has strong collinearity with GDP. Hence, it is important 
to detect multicollinearity and high correlations between variables before including 
them into the same regression. 
Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) find that unemployment is the most important 
macroeconomic driver for household defaults in the Czech Republic: it has a positive 
and significant relation with household defaults. If a household defaults, it naturally 
causes a credit loss for a bank. Unemployment affects also the household income and 
if the household is over-indebted, it is highly likely that this household defaults due to 
a lower income stream in the case of unemployment (Jakubik & Schmieder, 2008.) 
Intuitively, household consumption is positively related to income and hence, 
household consumption and household income should both have a negative relation 
with loan defaults and credit losses (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002).  
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In this study, by following Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), investment is measured as 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) which is the acquisition and creation of assets 
by producers for their own use, minus disposals of produced fixed assets (OECD, 
2019). According to Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), companies invest more when the 
economic outlook is favorable. During economic upturns, credit losses typically 
decrease and hence, it is expected that corporate investments are negatively related to 
credit losses. This assumption is supported by the findings by Festić, Kavkler and 
Repina (2011): the GFCF lowers the non-performing loans to total assets in the certain 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Bankruptcies, instead, typically increase 
during economic downturns. Hence, bankruptcies are expected to be positively related 
to credit losses (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). Findings by Gerlach, Peng and Shu (2005) 
support the expected relation as they find  that bankruptcies have a positive relation 
with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  Obviously, if a company goes 
bankrupt, there is a high risk that the company is unable to repay its debt obligations 
which in turn appears as an increase in non-performing loans and credit losses.  
According to Fisher (1933), over-indebtedness will lead to the growing number of 
bankruptcies and unemployment. Thus, it would be logical that credit losses have a 
positive relation with indebtedness. Vlieghe (2001) notes that corporate indebtedness 
also influences the willingness of banks to lend. If the corporate indebtedness is high, 
banks would reduce lending in order to avoid additional credit losses whereas if the 
corporate sector is not over-indebted, banks would be more willing to lend because the 
increase of credit losses is less probable. Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) measure 
indebtedness as corporate credit-to-GDP ratio and find that this variable plays a 
significant role for the prediction of corporate default rates. However, this 
specification takes only into account the indebtedness of firms, but banks lend money 
to both firms and households. The private sector credit-to-GDP would wholly capture 
the indebtedness of the private sector. 
3.4 Stock market indicators 
Stock markets are related to the economic cycle. When stock markets increase, stock 
returns are higher to investors which lowers the probability of loan defaults (Kalirai & 
Scheicher, 2002). Stock market is usually in an upward trend when the corporates’ 
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financial health is better. Hence, the assumption is that corporate defaults and credit 
losses are negatively related to the stock market’s upturn. A stock market index also 
reflects the future cash flows of business borrowers and the wealth of household 
borrowers (Krainer, 2014). Hence, using these holdings may influence the bank 
performance too. 
Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu (2013) examine the macroeconomic determinants of non-
performing loans across 75 countries during the past decade. They find that decline of 
stock prices influences bank asset quality, especially in countries with large stock 
markets relative to the size of the economy. Krainer (2014) examines the differences 
between a traditional demand-oriented model of bank lending and a non-traditional 
capital budgeting model based on stock market valuations in the Euro area. He finds 
that the stock market has an important role in the bank lending decisions. Castro (2013) 
examines the relation between macroeconomic developments and bank credit risk in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy and finds that an increase in stock prices 
leads to a reduction in non-performing loans. However, it takes some time before the 
effect on credit risk is significant (Castro, 2013). Hence, the relation between the stock 
market and credit losses is expected to be negative and to have a lag before appearing 
statistically significant. 
3.5 Interest rate indicators 
Interest rates reflect direct costs of borrowing and hence the higher the rates, the greater 
the probability of default (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). Thus, the relation between 
credit losses and interest rates is typically positive. However, there might be a lag 
between these two:  interest rates rise or fall preceding the failure rate of companies 
and hence preceding the change in credit losses (Liu, 2004). 
The relation can be estimated for instance by regressing credit losses on the real or  the 
nominal interest rates with different maturities, such as 3-month, 6-month and 12-
month interest rates.  Jiménez and Mencía (2009) use the 3-month real interest rate 
whereas Virolainen (2004) prefers 12-month nominal interest rates. Kalirai and 
Scheicher (2002) use both nominal and real interest rates to study their effect on credit 
loss allowances. Bali et al. (2014) apply relative T-bill rate, defined as the difference 
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between the 3-month T-bill rate and its 12-month backward moving average. Ali and 
Daly (2010) use the 6-month treasury bill rate measured as market yield on US 
Treasury notes at 6-month constant maturity, quoted on investment basis. Thus, the 
preferred measures and maturities vary depending on the study.  
The term spread, also known as the steepness of the yield curve, is measured as the 
long-term interest rate minus the short-term interest rate. Under expectations 
hypothesis the term spread is a forward-looking measure of the future short-term 
interest rates and thus reflects the future short-term borrowing costs (Ang et al., 2011). 
According to Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), the term spread indicates the impact of 
monetary policy and the economic cycle. A relatively steep yield curve is related to 
the fast growth of the economy. Therefore, future interest rates are expected to rise to 
produce inflationary pressures (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). The relation between the 
term spread and the credit losses is negative in this case. However, the future higher 
interest rates are related to greater costs of borrowing and like mentioned earlier, 
interest rates are typically positively related to the credit losses. Hence, the higher 
future interest rates potentially lead to greater credit losses in the future. The steep 
yield curve today will be flatter in the future due to high short-term interest rates. Flat 
yield curve indicates a recession. This dynamic nature of the term spread makes its 
relationship with credit losses ambiguous (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). 
3.6 Other indicators 
Other indicators include exports and exchange rates. Small open economies can be 
more sensitive to changes in exports (Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). A decrease in 
exports is also one example of a shock to the GDP. A decreasing GDP indicates an 
economic downturn and is expected to be associated with increasing credit losses. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) also note that exports are in a lower level during 
banking crises compared to normal times. This strengthens the assumption of negative 
relation between exports and credit losses. 
Exchange rates and exports are related to each other – a real exchange rate appreciation 
may weaken the performance of export-oriented firms and thus lead to loan defaults 
(Fofack, 2005). On the other hand, the appreciation of a real exchange rate can improve 
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the repayment ability of borrowers who borrow in a foreign currency. This can lead to 
a decrease in the number of loan defaults (Nkusu, 2011.) Thus, the relation between 
exchange rates and credit losses can be either positive or negative. 
Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) examine and compare the macroeconomic determinants 
of credit risk in the Czech Republic and Germany. They show that the real exchange 
rate has a significant impact on firms’ default rates in the Czech Republic: the 
appreciation of domestic currency has a positive relation with corporate credit risk. 
Boss (2002) also finds that the exchange rate index from the previous period has a 
significant positive impact on credit defaults. These findings suggest that the 
appreciation of the exchange rate is related to an increase in defaults and thus also to 
an increase in credit losses. 
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4 BANK-SPECIFIC VARIABLES AND CREDIT LOSSES 
In this thesis, not only the macroeconomic factors but also bank-specific variables are 
taken into account. Existing literature concentrates on bank-specific variables and their 
relation to non-performing loans and credit risk. Non-performing loans, credit risk and 
credit losses are closely related to each other. Thus, the bank-specific variables related 
to non-performing loans are likely to be related to credit losses. 
4.1 Inefficiency 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) investigate the effect of bank-specific variables on 
problem loans in US commercial banks. They formulate mechanisms, called bad 
management, bad luck, skimping and moral hazard that are related to efficiency and 
capital adequacy. Their findings suggest that a decrease in cost efficiency is related to 
increasing future problem loans. Podpiera and Weill (2008) end up with similar 
findings with Berger and DeYoung (1997) as they find that a decrease in cost 
efficiency leads to an increase in non-performing loans in Czech banks between 1994 
and 2005. 
Inefficient banks, that have problems with monitoring their internal costs, might also 
have problems with estimating non-performing loans. Thus, bad management of costs 
has a positive relation with future non-performing loans and hence with credit losses. 
This is called the bad management hypothesis. The bad luck hypothesis refers to a 
situation where an event that is beyond a bank’s control can lead to a non-performing 
loan. Hence, a bank needs more resources to recover the non-performing loan leading 
to cost inefficiency. Using more resources might help to avoid credit losses in the 
future but the costs will increase. Thus, the bad luck hypothesis says that the relation 
is negative between credit losses and inefficiency. The skimping hypothesis means that 
a bank which spends insufficient resources to reach proper loan quality will end up 
with a high level of non-performing loans in the long run and  the relation of credit 
losses and inefficiency is positive in the future. Thus, the relationship between 
inefficiency and non-performing loans can be positive or negative (Berger & 
DeYoung, 1997.)  
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Berger and DeYoung (1997) measure short-term efficiency as a percent of maximum 
cost efficiency achieved by bank based on the estimated best-practice cost frontier for 
the year in question. Louzis et al. (2012) examine the determinants of non-performing 
loans in the Greek banking sector. They use the ratio of operating expenses to 
operating income to measure inefficiency similarly as Chaibi and Ftiti (2015). The 
ratio of operating expenses to operating income is simpler, more easily available and 
hence more comparable than the measure by Berger and DeYoung (1997). Thus, I 
prefer to use the ratio of operating expenses to operating income as a measure of 
inefficiency. 
4.2 Leverage 
A capital structure is likely to affect credit risk. Highly leveraged banks tend to take 
more risk due to a need for producing higher returns with lower capital (Chaibi & Ftiti, 
2015.) According to Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), the positive relation between banks’ risk 
and leverage is expected because financial risk increases with leverage. Hence, if more 
leverage is used, it is expected that credit losses increase too.  
Louzis et al. (2012) measure leverage as the ratio between total liabilities to total assets 
and find a positive relation between leverage and non-performing loans. Chaibi and 
Ftiti (2015) use the same measure and find that leverage is a significant determinant 
of credit risk in Germany, but not in France. Ahmad and Ariff (2007) examine the 
determinants of credit risk between commercial banks in emerging economies and 
developed economies. They do neither find a significant relation between leverage and 
credit risk which is contrary to theory and past evidence for different test periods 
(Ahmad & Ariff, 2007). Thus, prior literature shows contradictory results of the 
significance of leverage as a determinant of credit risk. 
4.3 Solvency  
Moral hazard is the well-known problem of excessive risk taking when another party 
is bearing the cost of risk. According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) under the moral 
hazard hypothesis, a reduction in capitalization leads to an increase in non-performing 
loans in the future. The reason is that thinly capitalized banks may respond to moral 
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hazard incentives by increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolios. Thus, the moral 
hazard hypothesis is a theory of the relationship between problem loans and capital 
ratios, also known as solvency ratios (Berger & DeYoung, 1997).  
Berger and DeYoung (1997) measure solvency as the ratio between equity capital to 
total assets. Louzis et al. (2012) and Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) also apply the same 
specification of solvency. However, the riskiness is better captured by the measure of 
capital weighted by risk than the equity-to-total-assets ratio that approximates the 
relevant capital constraint poorly under the Basel standards (Altunbas, Gambacorta, & 
Marques-Ibanez, 2010; Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004). Hence, it would be more 
relevant use, for instance, the Tier 1 capital ratio instead of equity capital to total assets 
(Bank for International Settlements, 1998). However, the Tier 1 is not always 
available, such as in a situation where a bank has not followed Basel standards. The 
equity-to-total-assets ratio, instead, should be available through different time periods 
and regardless of standards followed.   
Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that a decrease in low-capitalized US commercial 
banks’ capital precedes an increase in non-performing loans. Ahmad and Ariff (2007) 
also find that regulatory capital is a significant determinant of credit risk for banks in 
emerging and developed economies but for Japan, Malaysia, and Mexico there is a 
positive relation while for Australia and India the relation is negative. However, Louzis 
et al. (2012) do not find a significant relation between solvency and non-performing 
loans in the Greek banking system. Hence, the significance seems to be dependent on 
the study, the sample and the empirical model. It is also worth noting that leverage and 
solvency are perfectly negatively correlated if the equity-to-total-assets ratio is used as 
the measure of solvency. If leverage should be positively related to credit losses, then 
solvency should be negatively related to credit losses. 
4.4 Size 
Size is a commonly used bank-specific variable in the literature and often measured as 
logarithm of total assets (e.g. Chaibi & Ftiti, 2015; Singh & Sharma, 2016). Salas and 
Saurina (2002) argue that bank size and non-performing loans are negatively related 
because the diversification opportunities increase with size. Louzis et al. (2012) call 
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this as the diversification hypothesis under which bank size is negatively related to 
non-performing loans. If the diversification hypothesis is true, size and credit losses 
should also have a negative relation. 
According to Stern and Feldman (2004), larger banks may take excessive risk because 
market discipline is not imposed by their creditors due to the expectation of 
government protection if a bank fails. These banks are known as too big to fail (TBTF) 
banks. They use more leverage, grant risky loans and eventually face more non-
performing loans (Stern & Feldman, 2004.) Stern and Feldman (2004) argue that the 
assumption of TBTF has played a crucial role in many banking crises in recent 
decades. Hence, bank size and non-performing loans should have a positive relation. 
Louzis et al. (2012) and Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) find this positive relation confirming 
that larger banks take excessive risks and have more non-performing loans (Chaibi & 
Ftiti, 2015). These findings suggest that the relation between credit losses and size 
could also be positive. 
4.5 Profitability 
It is intuitive that past performance is negatively related to non-performing loans. 
According to Louzis et al. (2012), past performance can also represent a proxy of the 
quality of management. They measure profitability as the return on equity similarly as 
Chaibi and Ftiti (2015). Both studies find that bank profitability is a significant 
determinant of non-performing loans. Thus, it is expected that bank profitability is 
negatively related to credit losses. 
However, it is possible that profitability is positively related to credit losses in the short 
run. Rajan (1994) explains the relation between credit policies of banks and demand 
side conditions, and he argues that managers with short horizons aim to manipulate 
current earnings to convince the market of the bank’s profitability. This can be done 
by extending the terms of loans, lending new money to insolvent borrowers and 
weakening the covenants in order to avoid the recognition of default (Rajan, 1994). 
Hence, the profitability might have a positive relation with credit losses in the short 
run. 
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4.6 Type of a bank 
The types of banks considered are commercial and savings banks in this study. 
Commercial and savings banks have different ownership structures and business 
objectives. According to Salas and Saurina (2002), commercial banks are for-profit 
organizations owned by shareholders and they provide universal banking services 
whereas savings banks focus mainly on retail banking and their profits are retained or 
distributed in cultural and social community programs. Hence, commercial banks 
should have a higher portion of corporate customers and savings banks a higher portion 
of households as customers. 
Salas and Saurina (2002) study credit risk of commercial and savings banks in Spain. 
They find that non-performing loans are more sensitive to the business cycles in 
commercial banks than in savings banks. According to Salas and Saurina, the possible 
explanations are that commercial banks have more corporate customers whereas 
savings banks have more retail customers and that commercial banks tend to 
concentrate more on foreign markets. Based on these findings, it is expected that credit 
losses are more sensitive to the macroeconomic factors in commercial banks than in 
savings banks. 
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5 DATA  
The aim of this study is to examine the relation between macroeconomic factors and 
credit losses. The sample consists of the annual time-series data of macroeconomic 
variables for 24 European countries and bank-specific variables for 202 European 
banks. The sample period covers 14 years from 2005 to 2018. The macroeconomic 
variables are collected from the OECD database expect the stock market indicators 
which are collected from the Worldscope database similarly as the bank-specific 
variables. 
5.1 Macroeconomic variables 
This study mainly follows the categorization by Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss 
(2002). Thus, macroeconomic variables are divided into six groups: cyclical 
indicators, price stability indicators, private sector indicators, stock market indicators, 
interest rate indicators and other indicators.  
Cyclical indicators are related to the general economic activity and are included 
because credit losses are expected to respond to economic cycles (Kalirai & Scheicher 
(2002). Cyclical indicators included are the real GDP and the industrial production 
index. Price stability indicators are inflation, which is measured as the consumer price 
index, narrow money (M1), which contains currency and overnight deposits 
circulating in the economy (OECD, 2012), and the nominal house price index. 
Private sector indicators reflect the wealth of the private sector. They consist of 
harmonized unemployment rate, household final consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, net national disposable income, gross fixed capital formation 
reflecting the corporate investments, private sector debt as a percentage of GDP 
describing the private sector indebtedness and the number of bankruptcies measured 
by the index. 
Stock market indicators are the STOXX Europe 600 index and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIND) index. The STOXX Europe 600 index reflects the state of 
the stock market in Europe and the DJIND index movements in the U.S. stock market. 
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There are linkages between spillover effects in the global markets and hence, the 
movements in the U.S. are also likely to have an influence in Europe (Kalirai & 
Scheicher, 2002). This is the reason why the DJIND index is also taken into account.  
Interest rate indicators include nominal and real long-term interest rates referring to 
government bonds maturing in ten years, nominal and real short-term interest rates 
referring to three-month money market rates and the term spread measured as the 
difference between the nominal long-term interest rate and the nominal short-term 
interest rate. Other indicators include exports of goods seasonally adjusted and the 
average of the annual exchange rate measured as the national currency per US dollar.  
All macroeconomic variables are measured as first differences expect the stock market 
indicators which are simple returns. The list of the macroeconomic variables, their 
specifications and the expected sign of the relation between the variable and credit 
losses is shown in table 1. The descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic are shown 
in appendix 1. 
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Table 1. The list of the macroeconomic variables, their specifications and the expected signs of 
the relation between the variable and credit losses. 
Variable Notation Expected sign Measure 
Cyclical indicators    
 Real GDP GDP - log differenced 
 Industrial production IND_PROD - absolute difference 
Price stability indicators    
 Inflation INF -/+ absolute difference 
 Narrow money (M1) M1 - absolute difference 
 House price index HPRICE -/+ absolute difference 
Household and corporate indicators    
 Unemployment UNEMP + log differenced 
 Consumption CON - log differenced 
 Income INC - log differenced 
 Gross fixed capital formation GFCF - log differenced 
 Bankruptcies BANKR + log differenced 
 Indebtedness INDEBT + log differenced 
Stock market indicators    
 STOXX Europe 600  STOXXE600 - simple returns 
 Dow Jones Industrial Average DJIND - simple returns 
Interest rate indicators    
 Nominal long-term interest rate NLTIR + absolute difference 
 Nominal short-term interest rate NSIR + absolute difference 
 Real long-term interest rate RLIR + absolute difference 
 Real short-term interest rate RSIR + absolute difference 
 Term spread TERM -/+ absolute difference 
Other indicators    
 Exports of goods EXP - log differenced 
 Exchange rate EXC -/+ log differenced 
 
5.2 Bank-specific variables 
Bank-specific variables consist of the credit losses, inefficiency, leverage, solvency, 
size, profitability and the type of a bank. Credit losses are measured as actual credit 
losses divided by the total assets in order to scale them with respect to the size of a 
bank. Inefficiency is measured as operating expenses divided by operating income. 
Leverage is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets whereas solvency is 
measured as the ratio of total equity divided to total assets. Leverage and solvency are 
perfectly negatively correlated due to the formalization of variables. Hence, only 
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solvency is considered in the regressions. Profitability is calculated as net income 
divided by total equity, and bank size is measured as the logarithm of total assets. 
Dummy variables are used to form three groups of inefficiency, solvency, size and 
profitability. For instance, there are low, medium and high inefficiency groups 
indicating whether a bank has low, medium or high inefficiency. A bank has low 
inefficiency if its ratio of operating expenses to operating income belongs to the lowest 
third among all banks’ similar ratios in year t. Respectively, high inefficiency refers to 
the highest third of these ratios in year , and medium inefficiency is between these two 
groups. Groups for solvency, size and profitability are formed in a similar manner, but 
with size, these groups are called small, medium and large instead of low, medium and 
high. 
The types of banks examined in this study are savings and commercial banks. Again, 
a dummy variable is used, and it takes the value of 1 if a bank is a savings bank and 
the value of 0 if a bank is a commercial bank. Table 2 shows the bank-specific 
variables, their abbreviations and specifications. Descriptive statistics for bank-
specific variables are shown in appendix 2. 
Table 2. Bank-specific variables.  
Variable Notation Measure 
Credit losses CLs Log difference of  the ratio of 
actual loan losses to total 
assets 
Inefficiency LEFF, MEFF, HEFF Operating expenses/Operating 
income; dummy variable 
Solvency LSOLV, MSOLV, HSOLV Total equity/total assets; 
dummy variable 
Size SMALL, MEDIUM, LARGE Log of total assets; 
dummy variable 
Bank profitability LPROF, MPROF, HPROF Net income/Total equity; 
dummy variable 
Type of a bank SAV, COMM Dummy variable 
CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, LEFF = low inefficiency bank, MEFF = 
medium inefficiency bank, HEFF = high inefficiency bank, LSOLV = low solvency bank, MSOLV = medium 
solvency bank, HSOLV = high solvency bank, SMALL = small bank, MEDIUM = medium-sized bank, LARGE 
= large bank, LPROF = low profitability bank, MPROF = medium profitability bank, HPROF = high 
profitability bank, SAV = savings bank, COMM = commercial bank. 
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6 METHODOLOGY 
Both univariate and multivariate regression specifications are applied in this study. 
Univariate regressions are used to examine the linear relationship between credit losses 
and each macroeconomic variable independently. To select the relevant variables for 
the multivariate regression specifications, I use stepwise regressions with Akaike 
information criteria (AIC) (Yan & Su, 2009, p. 171). The multivariate linear 
regressions are similar as the univariate regression specifications, but there are several 
explanatory variables instead of one. The multivariate logistic regressions are used to 
examine the relation between the extreme credit loss changes and macroeconomic 
variables.  Bank-specific dummies are also added to the  multivariate specifications. 
In addition, the interaction terms of macroeconomic and bank-specific variables are 
added into the multivariate linear specification in order to examine whether the relation 
between credit loss changes and the changes in macroeconomic variables depend on 
bank size and the type of a bank. 
The empirical analysis is not based only on the pooled regressions, but also on the 
regressions with fixed effects that are added to both univariate and multivariate linear 
regression specifications to deal with unobservable heterogeneity of banks and to 
avoid the omitted variable bias.  
6.1 Univariate regression specifications 
A panel data is used to examine the effects of the macroeconomic variables on the 
credit losses of banks. First, I examine univariate regressions to see the relation 
between the change of an individual variable and the change of credit losses of the 
following year. Univariate regressions are linear regressions specified as: 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡, (1) 
where ∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the log difference of credit losses divided by total assets in bank 𝑖 
operating in country 𝑘 in year 𝑡. ∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1 is the log difference or absolute difference of 
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the macroeconomic variable in country k in year 𝑡 − 11. 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the error term. The aim 
is to identify those macroeconomic variables that are useful for estimating future credit 
losses. As the variables are changes, it is possible to examine whether a change in a 
macroeconomic variable affects the next year’s credit losses. 
The regressions with bank fixed effects are used to account unobserved common 
factors that affect the credit losses but are not captured by the observable 
macroeconomic or bank-specific variables. The fixed effects model allows the 
intercept to differ across the banks but not over time. If the unobservable heterogeneity 
was not controlled, the correlated unobservable factors, for instance economic 
environment and management quality, with the variables of interest cause an omitted 
variable bias making the interpretation of causalities inappropriate. The fixed effects 
model is one way to deal with the unobservable heterogeneity by transforming both 
the dependent and independent variables (Gormley & Matsa, 2013.)  
When the fixed effects are added to the univariate specifications, the univariate model 
is specified as: 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡, (2) 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the unknown intercept for each bank. 
6.2 Multivariate regression specifications 
Before conducting the multivariate regression analysis, variables are standardized to 
have the mean equal to zero and the variance of 1. This is to make the interpretation 
and the comparison of macroeconomic variables easier. The standardization is done 
by subtracting the mean of the variable and dividing the result by the variable’s 
standard deviation: 
                                                 
1 In the case of the stock market indicators, ∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1 refers to simple returns in year t-1. 
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𝑍𝑋 =
𝑋−?̅?
𝜎(𝑋)
,   (3) 
where Z is the Z-score i.e. standardized value of variable, X is the variable, ?̅? is the 
mean of the variable and 𝜎(𝑋) is the standard deviation of the variable. 
6.2.1 Stepwise regressions and multicollinearity tests 
The multivariate model is constructed so, that highly correlated macroeconomic 
variables do not end up in the same regression. Hence, the correlations of 
macroeconomic variables, that are shown in table 3, are inspected. According to 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2013, pp. 89–90), two variables that have a correlation more 
than 0.70, should not be included in the same multiple regression without careful 
consideration and hence, variables that have correlation more than |0.70|, are separated 
in different groups. 
One might think that separating the variables in different groups can lead to a situation 
where an important explanatory variable is omitted from the regression. According to 
Brooks (2014, p. 179), if an important variable is omitted, the estimated coefficients 
of included variables are biased and inconsistent expect if the omitted variable is 
uncorrelated with all included variables. But even if there was uncorrelation between 
the omitted variable and included variables, the intercept would be biased making also 
the forecasts biased. In addition, the standard errors will be biased and consequently, 
inappropriate inferences of hypothesis tests would be made (Brooks, 2014, p. 179.) 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for the first differences of credit losses in year t and first differences of macroeconomic variables in year t-1.  
  CLs GDP_1 IND_PROD_1 INF_1 M1_1 HPRICE_1 UNEMP_1 CON_1 INC_1 GFCF_1 BANKR_1 
CLs 1           
GDP_1 -0.1 1          
IND_PROD_1 -0.03 0.83 1         
INF_1 -0.003 0.44 0.57 1        
M1_1 -0.06 0.43 0.41 0.13 1       
HPRICE_1 -0.11 0.67 0.47 0.25 0.45 1      
UNEMP_1 0.06 -0.69 -0.64 -0.37 -0.52 -0.58 1     
CON_1 0.02 -0.59 -0.58 -0.21 -0.2 -0.23 0.34 1    
INC_1 -0.06 0.88 0.74 0.33 0.37 0.6 -0.65 -0.58 1   
GFCF_1 -0.13 0.86 0.7 0.34 0.3 0.68 -0.74 -0.51 0.77 1  
BANKR_1 0.11 -0.54 -0.61 -0.23 -0.24 -0.48 0.7 0.25 -0.52 -0.64 1 
INDEBT_1 0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.03 0.12 0.28 -0.08 0.23 -0.04 0.05 0.1 
STOXXE600_1 -0.03 0.54 0.68 0.38 0.16 0.4 -0.27 -0.46 0.53 0.43 -0.42 
DJIND_1 -0.001 0.51 0.71 0.53 0.11 0.28 -0.29 -0.4 0.48 0.39 -0.41 
NLIR_1 0.22 -0.03 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.1 -0.1 -0.04 
NSIR_1 -0.01 0.58 0.65 0.56 0.15 0.43 -0.59 -0.3 0.44 0.55 -0.42 
RLIR_1 0.06 -0.38 -0.47 -0.59 -0.17 -0.16 0.26 0.22 -0.41 -0.3 0.27 
RSIR_1 -0.04 -0.1 -0.22 -0.53 -0.14 0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.18 0.02 0.04 
TERM_1 0.17 -0.49 -0.47 -0.26 -0.07 -0.29 0.45 0.27 -0.44 -0.52 0.45 
EXP_1 -0.01 0.6 0.65 0.57 -0.02 0.34 -0.41 -0.34 0.47 0.47 -0.27 
EXC_1 0.04 -0.27 -0.21 -0.19 0.15 -0.21 0.24 0.07 -0.2 -0.26 0.04 
Table continues. 
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Table 3 ‒ continued. 
  INDEBT_1 STOXXE600_1 DJIND_1 NLIR_1 NSIR_1 RLIR_1 RSIR_1 TERM_1 EXP_1 EXC_1 
INDEBT_1 1          
STOXXE600_1 -0.1 1         
DJIND_1 -0.21 0.89 1        
NLIR_1 0.15 0.04 0.07 1       
NSIR_1 0.1 0.44 0.51 0.27 1      
RLIR_1 0.17 -0.46 -0.51 0.49 -0.25 1     
RSIR_1 0.19 -0.33 -0.37 0.11 0.16 0.77 1    
TERM_1 0.05 -0.32 -0.35 0.64 -0.57 0.61 -0.04 1   
EXP_1 0.05 0.54 0.63 0.24 0.68 -0.23 -0.02 -0.34 1  
EXC_1 -0.15 -0.15 -0.26 -0.21 -0.48 -0.07 -0.25 0.2 -0.76 1 
_1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, IND_PROD = absolute difference of industrial 
production, INF = absolute difference of inflation, M1 = absolute difference of narrow money, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index, UNEMP = log difference of 
harmonized unemployment rate, CON = log difference of household final consumption expenditure as % of GDP, INC = log difference of net national disposable income, GFCF = log 
difference of gross fixed capital formation, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies measured by the index, INDEBT = log difference of the private sector debt-to-GDP, 
STOXXE600 = simple return of the STOXX Europe 600 index, DJIND = simple return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, NLIR = absolute difference of the nominal long-term 
interest rate, NSIR = absolute difference of the nominal short-term interest rate, RLIR = absolute difference of the real long-term interest rate, RSIR = absolute difference of the real short-
term interest rate, TERM = absolute difference of term spread defined as the nominal long-term interest rate minus the nominal short-term interest rate, EXP = log difference of exports of 
goods seasonally adjusted, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as the national currency per US dollar. 
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However, including explanatory variables that are highly correlated in the same 
regression leads to near multicollinearity or even perfect multicollinearity if the 
explanatory variables are perfectly correlated (Brooks, 2014, pp. 170-171). According 
to Brooks (2014, p. 171), all coefficients cannot be estimated if perfect 
multicollinearity exists. If there is near multicollinearity, the R-squared of the 
regression is high but the coefficients will have high standard errors, the regression is 
sensitive to small changes and the confidence intervals are wide. Therefore, the 
significance tests might yield inappropriate inferences (Brooks, 2014, p. 172.) Hence, 
it is justifiable to attempt to tackle multicollinearity by dividing the highly correlated 
macroeconomic variables to different groups. In addition, fixed effects models are 
applied in order to avoid the omitted variable bias (Gormley & Matsa, 2013). 
GDP is one of the main variables of interest, and hence industrial production, income 
and gross fixed capital formation are left outside the multivariate model construction. 
In addition, the DJIND index is excluded because it is highly correlated with the 
STOXX Europe 600 index to make the model construction easier. 
Based on the correlations, macroeconomic variables are divided into four groups that 
are shown in table 4. I use stepwise regressions based on Akaike information criteria 
(AIC) with backward selection to find the best combination of the variables of each 
group (Yan & Su, 2009, pp. 171–172). This method is chosen because it is infeasible 
to construct all possible regressions manually when there is a large set of possible 
explanatory variables (Yan & Su, 2009, p. 171). The backward selection includes first 
all explanatory variables and starts to exclude them sequentially based on Akaike 
information criterion in a stepwise manner until there is no variable left to remove any 
more (Hebbali, 2017). 
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Table 4. Groups of variables that have a correlation < |0.70| with each other. 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
GDP_1 GDP_1 GDP_1 GDP_1 
INF_1 INF_1 INF_1 INF_1 
M1_1 M1_1 M1_1 M1_1 
HPRICE_1 HPRICE_1 HPRICE_1 HPRICE_1 
UNEMP_1 UNEMP_1 UNEMP_1 UNEMP_1 
CON_1 CON_1 CON_1 CON_1 
BANKR_1 BANKR_1 BANKR_1 BANKR_1 
INDEBT_1 INDEBT_1 INDEBT_1 INDEBT_1 
STOXXE600_1 STOXXE600_1 STOXXE600_1 STOXXE600_1 
NLIR_1 NLIR_1 NLIR_1 NLIR_1 
NSIR_1 NSIR_1 NSIR_1 NSIR_1 
RLIR_1 RLIR_1   
  RSIR_1 RSIR_1 
TERM_1 TERM_1 TERM_1 TERM_1 
EXP_1  EXP_1  
  EXC_1   EXC_1 
_1 refers to the lag by one year. GDP = log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, 
M1 = absolute difference of narrow money, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index, 
UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, CON = log difference of household final 
consumption expenditure as % of GDP, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies measured 
by the index, INDEBT = log difference of the private sector debt-to-GDP, STOXXE600 = simple return of 
the STOXX Europe 600 index, NLIR = absolute difference of the nominal long-term interest rate, NSIR = 
absolute difference of the nominal short-term interest rate, RLIR = absolute difference of the real long-term 
interest rate, RSIR = absolute difference of the real short-term interest rate, TERM = absolute difference of 
term spread defined as the nominal long-term interest rate minus the nominal short-term interest rate, EXP = 
log difference of exports of goods seasonally adjusted, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate 
measured as the national currency per US dollar. 
To detect possible multicollinearity, a variance inflation factor (VIF) is computed for 
each variable in the preferred multivariate regression. The VIF describes the amount 
of variance of a regression coefficient which is inflated because of multicollinearity in 
the model. The VIF of each variable is calculated by using formula: 
𝑉𝐼𝐹(?̂?𝑗) =
1
1−𝑅𝑋𝑗|𝑋−𝑗
2  ,  (4) 
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where 𝑅𝑋𝑗|𝑋−𝑗
2  is the  𝑅2 from a regression of Xj onto all of the other predictors. As a 
rule of thumb a VIF that exceeds 5 might indicate that multicollinearity is a problem 
in the model (James, Witten, Hastie & Tibshirani, 2013.) 
6.2.2 Linear regressions 
The multivariate linear regressions include several explanatory variables. It allows 
comparing the explanatory power of independent variables and to get better parameter 
estimates. The multivariate linear specification is in the form of: 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡,   (5) 
where ∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛  is the log difference or the absolute difference of the macroeconomic 
variable 𝑋𝑛 in country 𝑘 in year 𝑡 − 1.2  In addition to macroeconomic variables, the 
multivariate specification with bank-specific dummy variables is used in order to 
examine the effects of inefficiency, solvency, size, profitability and the type of a bank. 
As a reminder, solvency and leverage are perfectly negatively correlated and thus, 
leverage is excluded from the regressions. The multivariate regression with bank-
specific dummies is:  
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝑀𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 +
𝐻𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝑀𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 + 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 + 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖 +
𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡,   
(6) 
where 𝑀𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 takes the value of 1 if bank 𝑖 belongs to the medium inefficiency group 
and 𝐻𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 takes the value of 1 if bank 𝑖 belongs to the highest inefficiency group. 
                                                 
2 In the case of the stock market indicators, ∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛
 refers to simple returns in year t-1. 
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Similarly,  M𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 takes the value of 1 indicating medium solvency and 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 takes 
the value of 1 indicating high solvency. If a bank is medium-sized, 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 takes 
the value of 1 and if a bank is large, 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖 takes the value of 1.  𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 takes the 
value of 1 if a bank has medium profitability and 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 takes the value of 1 if a 
bank has high profitability.  𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖 takes the value of 1 if a bank is a savings bank and  
0 if a bank is a commercial bank. 
In addition to including the bank-specific dummies, the interaction terms are added to 
the multivariate linear regression in order to examine whether the relation between 
credit loss changes and the changes in macroeconomic variables depend on bank size 
and the type of a bank.  This is to examine whether the credit losses of larger banks 
are more sensitive to fluctuations in an economy or whether they can diversify the risk 
related to macroeconomic variables and also to see whether the credit losses of 
commercial banks are more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic variables 
compared to the credit losses of savings banks. 
The multivariate linear specifications with fixed effects are also examined to deal with 
the unobservable heterogeneity of banks and to avoid the omitted variable bias 
(Gormley & Matsa, 2013). The specification of the multivariate linear model with 
fixed effects is: 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 . (7) 
 
6.2.3 Logistic regressions 
I examine whether the macroeconomic and bank-specific variables have a relation with 
the extreme credit loss increases or decreases of the following year by using 
multivariate logistic regressions i.e. logit models. There are two different logistic 
regression specifications. In the first specification, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable of credit loss changes of bank 𝑖 which gets the values of 1 and 0 each year – 
one if an extreme credit loss increase occurs in bank 𝑖 during the year t and zero 
otherwise, i.e.:  
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∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
 (8) 
A bank has faced an extreme credit loss increase in a specific year, if the credit loss 
increase belongs to the highest quartile of credit loss changes of all banks during that 
year. The logit model is specified as: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑃(∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1)) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 + 𝛽2∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
2 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
2𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖 , 
(9) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖 refers to bank-specific dummies. The probability of the occurrence of an 
extreme credit loss increase is:  
𝑃(∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
𝑒𝛽𝑜+𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 +⋯+𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 +𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
1𝑖+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖
1 + 𝑒𝛽𝑜+𝛽1∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
1 +⋯+𝛽𝑛∆𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝑛 +𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
1𝑖+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖  . 
(10) 
The second logistic regression specification is otherwise similar as the first 
specification, but the dependent binary variable is an extreme credit loss decrease. An 
extreme credit loss decrease has occurred in bank 𝑖 when the credit loss change belongs 
to the lowest quartile of credit loss changes of all banks during the year in question. 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an extreme credit loss decrease has 
occurred and zero otherwise.  
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7 RESULTS 
7.1 Univariate regression specifications 
Both pooled univariate regressions and regressions with bank fixed effects are 
estimated. Table 5 shows the pooled univariate regression results3 for cyclical and 
price stability indicators. GDP is significant at the 1 % significance level. The sign of 
the coefficient is negative as expected: when an economy is growing, credit losses 
decrease.  Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) do not find a significant relation between GDP 
and credit risk, but several other studies with different methodologies, for instance 
Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), Ali and Daly (2010) and Virolainen (2004), point out that GDP 
has a significant relationship with non-performing loans or defaults. Industrial 
production, instead, is insignificant though the sign is negative as expected. 
The only significant price stability indicator of the pooled univariate regressions is the 
house price index with a negative coefficient. This strengthens the hypothesis that the 
role of property plays an important role as collateral (Vlieghe, 2001). As the value of 
property is higher, additional sources of collateral are less needed. On the other hand, 
the house price index can reflect inflation, the increasing price level. Hence, the 
negative relation between credit loss changes and the changes in the house price index 
might stem from the negative relation between credit losses and inflation: credit losses 
might decrease because the real value of debt will decrease as inflation occurs (Jakubik 
& Schmieder, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 All tables showing the results are created in R by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Hlavac (2018). 
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Table 5. Pooled univariate regression results for cyclical and price stability indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP_1 -0.059***     
 (0.019)     
IND_PROD_1  -0.0001    
  (0.0001)    
INF_1   -0.00004   
   (0.0004)   
M1_1    -0.0001  
    (0.0001)  
HPRICE_1     -0.0002*** 
     (0.0001) 
Constant 0.001** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) 
Observations 906 891 891 310 861 
R2 0.011 0.001 0.00001 0.004 0.013 
Adjusted R2 0.010 -0.0004 -0.001 0.001 0.011 
Residual Std. Error 
0.013 (df = 
904) 
0.013 (df = 
889) 
0.013 (df = 
889) 
0.005 (df = 
308) 
0.014 (df = 
859) 
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the 
ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, IND_PROD = absolute difference 
of industrial production, INF = absolute difference of inflation, M1 = absolute difference of narrow money, 
HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index. 
The results of pooled univariate regressions for the private sector and stock market 
indicators are shown in table 6. Significant private sector indicators are 
unemployment, income, GFCF and bankruptcies. Unemployment and bankruptcies 
have positive coefficients whereas income and GFCF have negative coefficients. 
Supportive findings include Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) who find that unemployment has 
a significant positive relation with non-performing loans and Jakubik and Schmieder 
(2008) who find that unemployment is the most important macroeconomic driver for 
household defaults in the Czech Republic. Jakubik and Schmieder also find a 
significant negative relation between Czech household income and defaults. GFCF 
also lowers non-performing loans according to Festić et al. (2011), and the findings by 
Gerlach et al. (2005) support the positive relation between the increase in credit losses 
and the growing number of bankruptcies. 
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Table 6. Pooled univariate regression results for private sector and stock market indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNEMP_1 0.006*        
 (0.003)        
CON_1  0.024       
  (0.034)       
INC_1   -0.026*      
   (0.016)      
GFCF_1    -0.027***     
    (0.007)     
BANKR_1     0.002***    
     (0.001)    
INDEBT_1      0.007   
      (0.012)   
STOXXE600_1       -0.00001  
       (0.00001)  
DJIND_1        0.00000 
        (0.00000) 
Constant 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Observations 891 902 902 902 661 891 917 917 
R2 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.011 0.0004 0.001 0.00001 
Adjusted R2 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.016 0.010 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.013 (df 
= 889) 
0.013 (df 
= 900) 
0.013 (df 
= 900) 
0.013 (df 
= 900) 
0.004 (df 
= 659) 
0.013 (df 
= 889) 
0.013 (df 
= 915) 
0.013 (df = 
915) 
Significance level *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of 
actual loan losses to total assets, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, CON = log difference 
of household final consumption expenditure as % of GDP, INC = log difference of net national disposable income, 
GFCF = log difference of gross fixed capital formation, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies 
measured by the index, INDEBT = log difference of the private sector debt-to-GDP, STOXXE600 = simple return 
of the STOXX Europe 600 index, DJIND = simple return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. 
Stock market indicators do not appear significant in the univariate regressions which 
is a contradictory result compared to the findings by Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and 
Boss (2002). Under these specifications, the relation between the changes in stock 
market indices and the changes in credit losses is insignificant. 
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All the other interest rate indicators except the short-term interest rates are significant 
in the pooled univariate regressions whereas both exports and the exchange rate are 
insignificant. The results for interest rate indicators and other indicators are shown in 
table 7.  
Table 7. Pooled univariate regression results for interest rate and other indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
NLIR_1 0.003***       
 (0.001)       
NSIR_1  -0.0001      
  (0.0004)      
        
RLIR_1   0.0005*     
   (0.0002)     
        
RSIR_1    -0.0004    
    (0.0003)    
        
TERM_1     0.002***   
     (0.0004)   
        
EXP_1      -0.001  
      (0.004)  
        
EXC_1       0.007 
       (0.006) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Observations 899 902 887 890 897 902 906 
R2 0.046 0.00004 0.004 0.002 0.030 0.00005 0.002 
Adjusted R2 0.045 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.029 -0.001 0.001 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.013 (df = 
897) 
0.013 (df = 
900) 
0.013 (df = 
885) 
0.013 (df = 
888) 
0.013 (df = 
895) 
0.013 (df = 
900) 
0.013 (df = 
904) 
 Significance level *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the 
ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, NLIR = absolute difference of the nominal long-term interest rate, 
NSIR = absolute difference of the nominal short-term interest rate, RLIR = absolute difference of the real long-
term interest rate, RSIR = absolute difference of the real short-term interest rate, TERM = absolute difference of 
term spread defined as the nominal long-term interest rate minus the nominal short-term interest rate, EXP = log 
difference of exports of goods seasonally adjusted, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured 
as the national currency per US dollar.  
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As expected, the relation between credit loss changes and changes in the long-term 
interest rates is positive. This is intuitive as the interest rates reflect the borrowing 
costs. For instance, Boss (2002) also finds a positive relation between default 
probability and the nominal long-term interest rate of the previous year. The term 
spread has also a positive coefficient. According to Ang et al. (2011), the term spread 
reflects the short-term borrowing costs under the expectations hypothesis. The positive 
coefficient of the term spread supports this hypothesis – as the short-term borrowing 
costs increase in the future, also the credit losses will increase in the future. 
When the bank fixed effects are added to the model, the model captures factors that 
vary over banks but not over time. Fixed effects help to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity and to avoid the omitted variable bias (Gormley & Matsa, 2013). Tables 
8–10  show the univariate regression results for the fixed effects models. Compared to 
pooled linear regression results, the results for the cyclical and price stability indicators 
do not differ much as the same variables, GDP and the house price index, are the only 
significant variables. The coefficient of the house price index remains the same, but 
the coefficient of GDP increases about 0.02 units and the significance level drops from 
1 % to the 10 % significance level. 
With the fixed effects, the only significant private sector indicator is GFCF. Hence, 
the bank fixed effects explain better the relation to credit losses than unemployment, 
income and bankruptcies. The coefficient of GFCF is still negative and significant at 
the 1 % significance level but slightly smaller. 
Results for the interest rate indicators differ only in minor respects from the pooled 
regression results when the fixed effects are added. The real long-term interest rate is 
not significant anymore compared to the pooled regression results, but otherwise the 
significance levels do not change, and the coefficients differ only slightly.  
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Table 8. Results of univariate regressions with fixed effects for cyclical and price stability 
indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP_1 -0.037*     
 (0.020)     
      
IND_PROD_1  -0.00002    
  (0.0001)    
      
INF_1   -0.0002   
   (0.0004)   
      
M1_1    0.00003  
    (0.0001)  
      
HPRICE_1     -0.0002*** 
     (0.0001) 
Observations 906 891 891 310 861 
R2 0.130 0.125 0.126 0.418 0.136 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.016 0.016 0.349 0.023 
Residual Std. Error 
0.013 (df = 
804) 
0.013 (df = 
791) 
0.013 (df = 
791) 
0.004 (df = 
276) 
0.013 (df = 
760) 
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the 
ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, IND_PROD = absolute difference 
of industrial production, INF = absolute difference of inflation, M1 = absolute difference of narrow money, 
HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index. 
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Table 9. Results of univariate regressions with fixed effects for private sector and stock market 
indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNEMP_1 0.003        
 (0.004)        
         
CON_1  0.010       
  (0.036)       
         
INC_1   -0.004      
   (0.017)      
         
GFCF_1    -0.020***     
    (0.007)     
         
BANKR_1     0.001    
     (0.001)    
         
INDEBT_1      -0.005   
      (0.013)   
         
STOXXE600_1       -0.00001  
       (0.00001)  
         
DJIND_1        -0.00000 
        (0.00000) 
Observations 891 902 902 902 661 891 917 917 
R2 0.126 0.125 0.125 0.133 0.400 0.126 0.128 0.126 
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.324 0.016 0.018 0.017 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.013 (df 
= 791) 
0.013 (df 
= 801) 
0.013 (df 
= 801) 
0.013 (df 
= 801) 
0.003 (df 
= 586) 
0.013 (df 
= 791) 
0.013 (df = 
814) 
0.013 (df 
= 814) 
Significance level *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the ratio 
of actual loan losses to total assets, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, CON = log 
difference of household final consumption expenditure as % of GDP, INC = log difference of net national 
disposable income, GFCF = log difference of gross fixed capital formation, BANKR = log difference of the 
number of bankruptcies measured by the index, INDEBT = log difference of the private sector debt-to-GDP, 
STOXXE600 = simple return of the STOXX Europe 600 index, DJIND = simple return of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index 
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Table 10. Results of univariate regressions with fixed effects for interest rate and other 
indicators. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
NLIR_1 0.002***       
 (0.001)       
NSIR_1  -0.0003      
  (0.0004)      
RLIR_1   0.0002     
   (0.0002)     
RSIR_1    -0.0004    
    (0.0003)    
TERM_1     0.002***   
     (0.0004)   
EXP_1      -0.003  
      (0.004)  
EXC_1       0.008 
       (0.006) 
Observations 899 902 887 890 897 902 906 
R2 0.141 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.139 0.126 0.128 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.031 0.017 0.019 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.013 (df = 
798) 
0.013 (df = 
801) 
0.013 (df = 
787) 
0.013 (df = 
790) 
0.013 (df = 
796) 
0.013 (df 
= 801) 
0.013 (df 
= 804) 
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the 
ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, NLIR = absolute difference of the nominal long-term interest rate, 
NSIR = absolute difference of the nominal short-term interest rate, RLIR = absolute difference of the real long-
term interest rate, RSIR = absolute difference of the real short-term interest rate, TERM = absolute difference of 
term spread defined as the nominal long-term interest rate minus the nominal short-term interest rate, EXP = log 
difference of exports of goods seasonally adjusted, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured 
as the national currency per US dollar. 
As a summary, GDP, the house price index, GFCF, the nominal long-term interest rate 
and the term spread are significant in both the pooled regressions and the regressions 
with fixed effects. However, GDP is significant only at the 10 % significance level in 
the fixed effects model whereas the rest of these variables are significant at the 1 % 
significance level regardless of the regression specification. Hence, based on these 
results, I conclude that especially the house price index, GFCF, the nominal long-term 
interest rate and the term spread can provide useful information of the possible changes 
in credit losses during the following year. 
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7.2 Multivariate regression specifications 
7.2.1 Stepwise regressions and multicollinearity tests 
The stepwise regressions and their Akaike information criteria based on the backward 
selection procedure are shown in table 11. The set of preferred explanatory variables 
for the multivariate model based on the lowest AIC, 116.303, consists of GDP, 
inflation, the house price index, unemployment, bankruptcies and the exchange rate. 
Table 11. Multivariate regressions recommended by the stepwise backward selections based on 
Akaike criteria. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP_1 -0.041* -0.037* -0.041* -0.037* 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
INF_1 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
HPRICE_1 -0.031** -0.029* -0.031** -0.029* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
UNEMP_1 -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
BANKR_1 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
EXC_1  0.018  0.018 
  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Constant -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 661 661 661 661 
R2 0.058 0.061 0.058 0.061 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.052 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 116.686 116.303 116.686 116.303 
Residual Std. Error 0.263 (df = 655) 0.262 (df = 654) 0.263 (df = 655) 0.262 (df = 654) 
Significance level *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the 
ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of 
inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized 
unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log 
difference of the annual exchange rate measured as the national currency per US dollar. 
The VIF values of the preferred macroeconomic variables based on the stepwise 
regressions are inspected. This is to detect whether there is a danger of 
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multicollinearity in the multivariate model. The VIF for GDP is 3.2, for inflation 1.5, 
for the house price index 2.0, for unemployment 2.7, for bankruptcies 2.2 and for the 
exchange rate 1.2. These results indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in the 
preferred multivariate model as all VIF values are below 5 (James et al., 2013.) 
When the bank-specific dummies are added to the model, the model specification is:  
∆𝐶𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝐻𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑘𝑡−1 +
𝛽4∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6∆𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 +
𝐻𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝑀𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 + 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑉𝑖 + 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖 +
𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡, 
(11) 
where  ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡−1 is the log difference of real GDP in country k at time 𝑡 − 1, 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑘𝑡−1 is the absolute difference of inflation,  ∆𝐻𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑘𝑡−1 is the absolute 
difference of the house price index, ∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑘𝑡−1 is the log difference in the 
harmonized unemployment rate, 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑘𝑡−1 is the log difference of the number of 
bankruptcies and 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑘𝑡−1 is the log difference of the national currency per US dollar. 
The correlation matrix for the variables in the multivariate model is shown in table 12 
in order to detect if there are high correlations between variables and to see which of 
the variables have the highest correlations with the dependent variable CLs. None of 
the correlations is above |0.7| indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem even 
the bank-specific variables are added. The VIF values are also below five: 3.2 for GDP, 
1.6 for inflation, 2.1 for the house price index, 2.7 for unemployment, 2.4 for 
bankruptcies, 1.2 for the exchange rate, 1.8 for medium inefficiency, 2, for high 
inefficiency, 1.3 for medium solvency, 2.1 for high solvency, 3.2 for medium size, 3.4 
for large size, 1.5 medium profitability, 1.6 for high profitability and 1.1 for savings 
banks.  The most correlated variables with CLs are GDP, the house price index and 
bankruptcies. 
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Table 12. Correlation matrix for the variables in the multivariate model. 
  CLs GDP_1 INF_1 HPRICE_1 UNEMP_1 BANKR_1 EXC_1 MEFF 
CLs 1        
GDP_1 -0.1 1       
INF_1 -0.003 0.44 1      
HPRICE_1 -0.11 0.67 0.25 1     
UNEMP_1 0.06 -0.69 -0.37 -0.58 1    
BANKR_1 0.11 -0.54 -0.23 -0.48 0.7 1   
EXC_1 0.04 -0.27 -0.19 -0.21 0.24 0.04 1  
MEFF -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.001 -0.01 1 
HEFF -0.02 -0.05 0.002 -0.09 0.06 0.05 0.004 -0.5 
MSOLV -0.01 0.01 -0.003 -0.01 0.003 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
HSOLV 0.02 0.05 -0.005 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.005 0.07 
MEDIUM -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.17 
LARGE -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.07 
MPROF -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.17 
HPROF -0.04 0.14 0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 
SAV 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.004 -0.001 0.02 0.01 
Table continues. 
 
Table 12 ‒ continued. 
  HEFF MSOLV HSOLV MEDIUM LARGE MPROF HPROF SAV 
HEFF 1        
MSOLV 0.04 1       
HSOLV -0.24 -0.5 1      
MEDIUM -0.06 0.12 0.03 1     
LARGE 0.14 -0.01 -0.32 -0.5 1    
MPROF 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.17 -0.04 1   
HPROF -0.25 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15 0.12 -0.5 1  
SAV -0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.01 1 
 _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of 
the house price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange 
rate measured as the national currency per US dollar, MEFF = medium inefficiency bank, HEFF = high inefficiency bank, MSOLV = medium solvency bank, HSOLV = high solvency bank, MEDIUM = 
medium-sized bank, LARGE = large bank, MPROF = medium profitability bank, HPROF = high profitability bank, SAV = savings bank. 
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7.2.2 Linear regressions 
Multivariate linear regressions are estimated with and without bank fixed effects. The 
results for multivariate regressions are shown in table 13. GDP is significant only in 
pooled multivariate regression (1) at the 10 % significance level, but it has the expected 
negative coefficient in all regressions. The insignificant coefficient is not surprising as 
Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) do neither find a significant relation between GDP and 
credit risk. 
Inflation is significant in all regressions with a positive coefficient which means that 
inflation and credit losses of the following year have a positive relation. This supports 
the explanation that inflation reduces the real income of households and firms (Chaibi 
& Ftiti, 2015). Another possible explanation is that rising inflation increases the costs 
of production, worsening the financial situation of firms. Hence, the ability of both 
households and firms to repay loans deteriorates. However, Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) do 
not find a significant positive relation between inflation and credit risk and neither do 
Kalirai and Scheicher (2002). Boss (2002), instead, finds a negative relation between 
inflation and the default probability. Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) find a 
positive relation between inflation and non-performing loans but mention that the 
relation is expected to be ambiguous. Hence, the findings are to some extent 
contradictory. The other price stability indicator, the house price index, is only 
significant in pooled regressions (1) and (2) and hence, there seems to be some 
unobservable bank-specific factors that explain better changes in credit losses than the 
house price index. However, its sign is negative in all regressions which is consistent 
with univariate regressions. 
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Table 13. Multivariate regression results without fixed effects and with fixed effects. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 OLS felm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP_1 -0.037* -0.035 -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
     
INF_1 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
HPRICE_1 -0.029* -0.029* -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
UNEMP_1 -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.033** -0.029* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
BANKR_1 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.023 0.023 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
EXC_1 0.018 0.018 0.016* 0.018* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
MEFF  -0.035  -0.031 
  (0.027)  (0.030) 
HEFF  -0.078***  -0.030 
  (0.030)  (0.031) 
MSOLV  0.015  -0.004 
  (0.029)  (0.041) 
HSOLV  -0.046  -0.135** 
  (0.033)  (0.059) 
MEDIUM  -0.099***  -0.304*** 
  (0.037)  (0.093) 
LARGE  -0.091**  -0.235* 
  (0.037)  (0.120) 
MPROF  -0.045*  -0.015 
  (0.025)  (0.023) 
HPROF  -0.089***  -0.042 
  (0.028)  (0.029) 
SAV  0.052   
  (0.043)   
Constant -0.011 0.166***   
 (0.011) (0.045)   
Observations 661 661 661 661 
R2 0.061 0.101 0.422 0.441 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.080 0.344 0.356 
Residual Std. Error 0.262 (df = 654) 0.259 (df = 645) 0.218 (df = 581) 0.216 (df = 573) 
F Statistic 
7.086*** (df = 6; 
654) 
4.833*** (df = 15; 
645) 
  
Table continues. 
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Table 13. – continued. 
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. OLS = pooled regression, felm 
= regression with fixed effects, CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = 
log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house 
price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the 
number of bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as 
the national currency per US dollar, MEFF = medium inefficiency bank, HEFF = high inefficiency bank, 
MSOLV = medium solvency bank, HSOLV = high solvency bank, MEDIUM = medium-sized bank, LARGE = 
large bank,, MPROF = medium profitability bank, HPROF = high profitability bank, SAV = savings bank. 
From the private sector indicators, unemployment appears significant in all 
regressions, but bankruptcies only in the pooled regressions. Oddly, unemployment 
has a negative sign. One possible explanation could be that banks do not grant loans 
for unemployed as easily as for employed people. As the unemployment rate increases 
this year, fewer loans are granted decreasing the number of total loans and possibly 
credit losses next year. This could be the case especially with short-term loans and for 
instance with credit cards. However, growth in unemployment should have a positive 
impact on credit losses at least in the long run. The 95 % confidence interval for 
unemployment has positive values in the fixed effects models and thus, the effect of 
unemployment is not necessarily negative but positive. Another issue is that 
unemployment has a correlation of -0.69 with GDP and 0.70 with bankruptcies which 
possibly change the effect to be negative. However, if GDP and bankruptcies were 
excluded, the explanatory power of the regression would drop. These regressions are 
also suggested by the multivariate model construction method explained in subsection 
6.2.1 and the VIF values, below 5, indicate that multicollinearity should not be a 
problem in this model (James et al., 2013). 
BANKR has a positive coefficient as expected. If a firm goes bankrupt, it is less likely 
to repay debt obligations. However, BANKR is insignificant in the fixed effects 
models. This means that unobservable factors explain better the changes in credit 
losses instead of bankruptcies. 
EXC has a positive coefficient indicating a positive relation between credit loss 
changes and the changes in the exchange rate. This finding is supported by Jakubik 
and Schmieder (2008) and Boss (2002). Jakubik and Schmieder find that the 
appreciation of domestic currency has a positive relation with corporate credit risk and 
Boss finds that the exchange rate index from the previous period has a significant 
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positive impact on credit defaults. Currency appreciation makes the exports more 
expensive which affects the financial situation of firms. This possibly leads to 
increasing credit losses stemming from the corporate loans. However, EXC is only 
significant in the fixed effects models at the 10 % significance level. 
The bank-specific dummies, significant in both the pooled regression and the 
regression with fixed effects are MEDIUM and LARGE. Both have negative 
coefficients. This means that small banks typically suffer from greater increases in 
credit losses and have smaller decreases in credit losses. This finding supports the 
diversification hypothesis: larger banks can diversify better the risk than small banks 
(Louzis et al., 2012). The findings by Salas and Saurina (2002) support these results 
as they find that size and non-performing loans have negative relation in commercial 
banks. However, there seems to be no significant differences between savings and 
commercial banks as SAV is not statistically significant. It is omitted from the 
regression with fixed effects because it is a bank-fixed variable that does not change 
over time. 
HEFF, MPROF and HPROF are significant only in the pooled regression. HEFF has 
a negative coefficient which means that high inefficiency banks face smaller increases 
and greater decreases in credit losses than low inefficiency banks. This result is 
contradictory with prior literature as Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Podpiera and 
Weill (2008) find that inefficiency (efficiency) is positively (negatively) related to 
non-performing loans. Banks having medium or high profitability face smaller 
increases and greater decreases in credit losses compared to low profitability banks. 
This is in line with prior literature. For instance, Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) find that higher 
profitability decreases non-performing loans. 
In addition to MEDIUM and LARGE, a significant bank-specific dummy is HSOLV 
in the regression with fixed effects.  HSOLV has a negative coefficient as expected 
which means that if a bank has a high solvency ratio, credit losses do not increase as 
much as if a bank has a low solvency ratio and if credit losses decrease, the decrease 
is greater in a bank with a high solvency ratio. This finding is supported by Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) who find that the reduction of capitalization leads to increasing non-
performing loans.   
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When the magnitudes of macroeconomic variables are compared, the results suggest 
that inflation and unemployment have the strongest effects on credit loss changes 
consistently in all regression specifications. BANKR has also a strong positive 
relation, but only in the pooled regressions. Hence, I conclude that based on these 
findings, the changes in inflation and in unemployment are important factors in 
explaining credit loss changes for the next year. I also conclude that the most important 
bank-specific variable explaining the changes in credit losses is bank size: small banks 
typically suffer from greater increases in credit losses compared to medium and large 
banks. The difference is greater between small and medium-sized banks as the 
coefficient of MEDIUM is larger in both regression specifications and it remains 
significant at the 1% significance level also after adding the bank fixed effects.  
In addition, the multivariate linear regressions with interactions between 
macroeconomic variables and size and also between macroeconomic variables and 
SAV are estimated. Interaction terms are added to examine whether the size of a bank 
change the effect of a macroeconomic variable on credit losses and whether there are 
differences in the effects of macroeconomic variables between commercial and 
savings banks. I focus on the interpretation of interaction terms.  
The interactions between macroeconomic variables and size are presented in table 14. 
The interaction term HRPICE*MEDIUM is economically and statistically significant 
in both regressions with and without fixed effects. The coefficient is positive indicating 
that the effect of the house price index is greater in medium-sized banks than in the 
small banks. Other interaction terms of macroeconomic variables and size are not 
significant in the regression with fixed effects. 
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Table 14. Regression results with the interaction terms of macroeconomic variables and size. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 OLS felm 
 (1) (2) 
GDP_1 -0.054 -0.015 
 (0.079) (0.076) 
INF_1 0.039 -0.013 
 (0.040) (0.037) 
HPRICE_1 -0.179*** -0.105** 
 (0.046) (0.052) 
UNEMP_1 -0.239*** -0.086** 
 (0.044) (0.041) 
BANKR_1 0.147** -0.039 
 (0.059) (0.059) 
EXC_1 0.018 0.029 
 (0.035) (0.032) 
MEFF -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.027) (0.031) 
HEFF -0.087*** -0.030 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
MSOLV 0.010 -0.011 
 (0.029) (0.041) 
HSOLV -0.072** -0.145** 
 (0.033) (0.060) 
MEDIUM -0.126*** -0.317*** 
 (0.039) (0.095) 
LARGE -0.128*** -0.251** 
 (0.040) (0.123) 
MPROF -0.044* -0.016 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
HPROF -0.094*** -0.039 
 (0.028) (0.031) 
SAV 0.028  
 (0.042)  
GDP_1:MEDIUM 0.011 -0.010 
 (0.089) (0.084) 
GDP_1:LARGE 0.043 -0.008 
 (0.083) (0.080) 
INF_1:MEDIUM 0.012 0.059 
 (0.046) (0.042) 
Table continues.  
 
 
58 
Table 14. – continued. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 OLS felm 
 (1) (2) 
INF_1:LARGE -0.007 0.048 
 (0.043) (0.040) 
HPRICE_1:MEDIUM 0.179*** 0.113** 
 (0.054) (0.057) 
HPRICE_1:LARGE 0.159*** 0.085 
 (0.051) (0.056) 
UNEMP_1:MEDIUM 0.209*** 0.072 
 (0.055) (0.051) 
UNEMP_1:LARGE 0.222*** 0.055 
 (0.051) (0.048) 
BANKR_1:MEDIUM -0.096 0.104 
 (0.072) (0.070) 
BANKR_1:LARGE -0.119* 0.061 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
EXC_1:MEDIUM -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.039) (0.036) 
EXC_1:LARGE 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.035) 
Constant 0.210***  
 (0.047)  
Observations 661 661 
R2 0.153 0.452 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.355 
Residual Std. Error 0.253 (df = 633) 0.217 (df = 561) 
F Statistic 4.251*** (df = 27; 633)  
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. OLS = pooled regression, felm 
= regression with fixed effects, CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = 
log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house 
price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the 
number of bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as 
the national currency per US dollar, MEFF = medium inefficiency bank, HEFF = high inefficiency bank, 
MSOLV = medium solvency bank, HSOLV = high solvency bank, MEDIUM = medium-sized bank, LARGE = 
large bank,, MPROF = medium profitability bank, HPROF = high profitability bank, SAV = savings bank. 
In addition to the interaction term HPRICE*MEDIUM, the interaction terms 
HPRICE*LARGE, UNEMP*MEDIUM, UNEMP*LARGE with the 1 % significance 
level and BANKR*LARGE with the 10 % significance level are significant in the 
pooled regression. All these interaction terms, expect the BANKR*LARGE, are 
positive indicating that credit losses of small banks are less sensitive to the changes in 
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house prices and in unemployment than credit losses of medium-sized and large banks. 
These results suggest that  bank size is an important variable for explaining credit loss 
changes and support the hypothesis that the credit loss changes of medium and large 
banks are more sensitive to the changes in macroeconomic factors. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) find that commercial banks, that typically operate in foreign countries, are more 
sensitive to economic fluctuations. Hence, the possible explanation with medium-sized 
and large banks could be that they also operate in foreign countries and thus they are 
more exposed to economic fluctuations than small banks.  
The interactions between macroeconomic variables and SAV are presented in table 15. 
HPRICE*SAV, UNEMP*SAV and BANKR*SAV are significant in the pooled 
regression. HPRICE*SAV and UNEMP*SAV have negative coefficients significant 
at the 1 % significance level. Hence, the changes in credit losses of commercial banks 
are more sensitive to the changes in house prices and unemployment compared to 
savings banks. This is a consistent result with the finding by Salas and Saurina (2002) 
who find that commercial banks are more sensitive to the economic fluctuations. The 
coefficient of BANKR*SAV is positive and significant at the 1 % significance level 
in the pooled regression meaning that credit losses of savings banks are more sensitive 
to the changes in the number of bankruptcies compared to commercial banks. None of 
the interactions between macroeconomic variables and SAV in the regression with 
fixed effects is significant. 
However, it is worth noting that the commercial banks dominate the sample as the 
descriptive statistics for bank-specific variables show in appendix 2. The number of 
commercial banks in the sample is 2380 whereas the number of savings banks is 181. 
Hence, the results might be affected by the small number of savings banks. 
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Table 15. Regression results with the interaction terms of macroeconomic variables and SAV. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 OLS felm 
 (1) (2) 
GDP_1 -0.023 -0.031 
 (0.021) (0.020) 
INF_1 0.033*** 0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
HPRICE_1 -0.024* -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
UNEMP_1 -0.035** -0.027 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
BANKR_1 0.027* 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
EXC_1 0.020* 0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
MEFF -0.012 -0.033 
 (0.025) (0.030) 
HEFF -0.054** -0.034 
 (0.027) (0.032) 
MSOLV 0.051* 0.006 
 (0.027) (0.041) 
HSOLV -0.019 -0.134** 
 (0.030) (0.059) 
MEDIUM -0.096*** -0.302*** 
 (0.033) (0.093) 
LARGE -0.067** -0.232* 
 (0.034) (0.121) 
MPROF -0.028 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
HPROF -0.060** -0.042 
 (0.025) (0.029) 
SAV 0.158***  
 (0.041)  
GDP_1:SAV 0.167 0.171 
 (0.134) (0.130) 
INF_1:SAV 0.026 -0.029 
 (0.039) (0.037) 
HPRICE_1:SAV -0.337*** -0.129 
 (0.094) (0.100) 
Table continues. 
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Table 15. – continued. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CLs 
 OLS felm 
 (1) (2) 
UNEMP_1:SAV -0.372*** -0.048 
 (0.067) (0.078) 
BANKR_1:SAV 0.767*** 0.166 
 (0.092) (0.107) 
EXC_1:SAV -0.058 0.026 
 (0.046) (0.045) 
Constant 0.104**  
 (0.041)  
Observations 661 661 
R2 0.260 0.445 
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.354 
Residual Std. Error 0.236 (df = 639) 0.217 (df = 567) 
F Statistic 10.680*** (df = 21; 639)  
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. OLS = pooled regression, felm 
= regression with fixed effects, CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = 
log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house 
price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the 
number of bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as 
the national currency per US dollar, MEFF = medium inefficiency bank, HEFF = high inefficiency bank, 
MSOLV = medium solvency bank, HSOLV = high solvency bank, MEDIUM = medium-sized bank, LARGE = 
large bank, MPROF = medium profitability bank, HPROF = high profitability bank, SAV = savings bank. 
 
7.2.3 Logistic regressions 
Logistic multivariate regressions are used to examine the relation of macroeconomic 
and bank-specific variables with extreme credit loss changes, i.e. credit loss changes 
in the highest quartile and extreme credit loss decreases, i.e. credit loss changes in the 
lowest quartile. The extreme credit loss changes are examined separately for every 
year of the sample period. Table 16 shows the logistic regression results. 
The significant variables for the logistic regression, where the dependent variable is 
the extreme credit loss increase, are BANKR, MSOLV, MEDIUM and LARGE. 
BANKR has a positive coefficient indicating that growing number of bankruptcies 
increases the probability of extreme credit loss increases. This is intuitive because 
usually before a firm goes bankrupt, everything is done in order to save a firm and to 
fulfill the debt obligations. The loans of firms are also greater than the loans of 
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households and hence, if a firm is unable to repay its debt, it is about greater credit loss 
increases than with households.  
The significant positive coefficient of MSOLV in logistic regression (1) indicates that 
banks having a medium solvency ratio are more likely to face extreme credit increases 
compared to low solvency banks. However, this variable is significant only at the 10% 
significance level. Instead, MSOLV is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level in logistic regression (2) indicating that banks that have a medium 
solvency ratio are more likely to face extreme credit loss decreases compared to banks 
with a low solvency ratio. This is not the case with banks with a high solvency ratio. 
The possible explanation is that there are no additional benefits of any higher solvency 
ratio after reaching a medium solvency ratio. These results might also indicate that 
medium solvency banks have more volatile changes in credit losses than low solvency 
banks as MSOLV is positive and statistically significant in both logistic regressions, 
although only at the 10 % significance level in regression (1). 
MEDIUM and LARGE have negative coefficients in logistic regression (1). This 
means that small banks are more likely to face extreme credit loss increases relative to 
their size than medium and large banks. Credit losses are scaled by total assets and 
hence, a possible explanation is that small banks face as much credit loss increases as 
medium and large banks, but the size of a bank is only smaller. These results are 
consistent with the results of the multivariate regressions – small banks suffer from 
greater increases in credit losses than medium and large banks.  
In addition to MSOLV, variables EXC, HEFF, and SAV are statistically significant in 
logistic regression (2), where the dependent dummy variable is the extreme credit loss 
decrease. EXC has a negative coefficient meaning that it is less likely that an extreme 
credit loss decrease occurs as the domestic currency appreciates. This strengthens the 
finding of the positive relation between credit loss changes and exchange rate changes 
in the multivariate regressions. The dummy variable HEFF is positive and significant 
indicating that banks having high inefficiency are more likely to face extreme credit 
loss decreases than low inefficiency banks. This supports the bad luck hypothesis: 
higher costs might be an indication of using more resources. Consequently, additional 
resources help to lower the future credit losses.  
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Table 16. Logistic regression results. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Extreme credit loss increase Extreme credit loss decrease 
 (1) (2) 
GDP_1 0.117 -0.123 
 
(0.209) (0.216) 
   
INF_1 -0.050 0.005 
 
(0.115) (0.121) 
   
HPRICE_1 -0.076 -0.174 
 
(0.143) (0.154) 
   
UNEMP_1 -0.231 0.106 
 
(0.168) (0.177) 
   
BANKR_1 0.334** -0.229 
 
(0.136) (0.161) 
   
EXC_1 0.125 -0.274** 
 
(0.104) (0.120) 
   
MEFF -0.342 -0.073 
 
(0.254) (0.280) 
   
HEFF -0.194 0.486* 
 
(0.264) (0.285) 
   
MSOLV 0.483* 0.778*** 
 
(0.257) (0.266) 
   
HSOLV -0.088 -0.011 
 
(0.312) (0.335) 
   
MEDIUM -1.362*** -0.326 
 
(0.314) (0.344) 
   
LARGE -0.823*** -0.116 
 
(0.310) (0.339) 
   
MPROF -0.321 -0.325 
 
(0.234) (0.249) 
   
HPROF -0.182 0.136 
 
(0.249) (0.260) 
   
SAV -0.056 0.898** 
 
(0.374) (0.359) 
   
Constant 0.083 -1.507*** 
 
(0.380) (0.420) 
Observations 661 661 
Log Likelihood -344.707 -318.129 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 721.414 668.259 
Significance level  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. _1 refers to the lag by one year. CLs = Log difference of  the ratio of actual loan 
losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, INF = absolute difference of inflation, HPRICE = absolute difference of 
the house price index, UNEMP = log difference of harmonized unemployment rate, BANKR = log difference of the number of 
bankruptcies measured by the index, EXC = log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as the national currency per US 
dollar, MEFF = medium inefficiency, HEFF = high inefficiency, MSOLV = medium solvency, HSOLV = high solvency , 
MEDIUM = medium-sized, LARGE = large, MPROF = medium profitability, HPROF = high profitability, SAV = savings bank. 
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The results suggest that savings banks are more likely to face extreme credit loss 
decreases compared to commercial banks as SAV is positive and significant at the 5 
% significance level. However, savings banks are not less nor more likely to face 
extreme credit loss increases because the variable is insignificant in logistic regression 
(1). However, as discussed in subsection 7.2.2, the number of savings banks in the 
sample is small and possibly affects the results. 
As a summary, medium size of a bank decreases the most the probability of the 
occurrence of the extreme credit loss increase whereas the growing number of 
bankruptcies increases the most this probability. If a bank is a savings bank, it increases 
the most the probability of the occurrence of the extreme credit loss decrease whereas 
the appreciation of domestic currency decreases the most this probability. MSOLV, 
i.e. a bank has a medium solvency ratio, affects also considerably the probability of 
the extreme credit loss decrease. Hence, the conclusion is that MEDIUM, BANKR, 
SAV, EXC and MSOLV are important variables in explaining extreme credit loss 
changes that occur during the following year.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
The credit loss modelling is a means to reflect credit risk and to make the financial 
health of a bank look more realistic. If the credit loss modelling is poorly implemented, 
it can have severe consequences as the financial crisis showed in 2008. Consequently, 
accounting standards have been improved from the financial crisis period, and 
nowadays IFRS standards allow using all relevant information that is available without 
undue cost including forward-looking information in the credit loss modelling. 
Macroeconomic factors provide this kind of forward-looking information and are 
easily available. Thus, they can be utilized in the credit loss modelling to estimate 
future expected credit losses. Hence, I apply an extensive set of macroeconomic 
variables based on the prior literature in order to find those ones that are useful for 
estimating the changes in credit losses for the following year. Thus, particularly the 
predictive relation is examined. In addition, the bank-specific features are also likely 
to affect the credit loss changes, so I include the bank-specific variables in the study. 
Especially, I examine the impact of bank size and the impact of the type of a bank on 
the relation between the changes in macroeconomic factors and credit loss changes. 
Prior studies focus mainly on a few countries whereas this thesis is based on the sample 
of 24 European countries and 202 banks from these countries. Thus, the results can be 
especially exploited in the credit loss modelling in European banks. As IFRS 9, 
including the expected credit loss model, has been effective only since 2018, it is likely 
that there is still a need for the improvements of banks’ credit loss models. Thus, the 
results have valuable implication for practical implementation of the credit loss models 
and estimating future credit losses. However, one should note that accounting 
standards have changed during the sample period of 2005–2008, and it is likely that 
not all 202 banks of the sample have followed the same standards. 
The empirical analysis is based on several pooled, fixed effects and logistic 
regressions. In addition, to select the relevant variables for the multivariate model, I 
use stepwise regressions based on Akaike information criteria (Yan & Su, 2009, pp. 
171–172). The preferred macroeconomic variables based on the stepwise regression 
results are GDP, inflation, the house price index, unemployment, bankruptcies and the 
exchange rate.  
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Based on the univariate regression results the house price index, gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF), the nominal long-term interest rate and the term spread are 
important determinants of the credit loss changes of the following year. The results 
suggest that the changes in the house price index are negatively related to the changes 
in credit losses and this finding is supported by  Vlieghe (2001) who argues that the 
short-run negative relation is due to the important role of property as collateral.  The 
changes in GFCF are also negatively related to credit loss changes in the univariate 
regressions which is supported by Festić et al. (2011) who find that the growth in 
GFCF lowers non-performing loans.  
Both the changes in the nominal long-term interest rate and the changes in the term 
spread have a positive relation with the changes in credit losses and these results are 
supported by Boss (2002). The nominal long-term interest rate reflects the long-term 
borrowing costs whereas the term spread reflects the future short-term borrowing costs 
(Ang et al., 2011; Kalirai & Scheicher, 2002). Thus, it is intuitive that the changes in 
borrowing costs are positively related to the changes in future credit losses. 
Based on the multivariate regression results, inflation and unemployment have the 
strongest effects on credit loss changes for the following year. Inflation has a positive 
relation with the increase in credit losses, but this finding is to some extent 
contradictory with prior literature. For instance, Boss (2002) finds a negative relation 
between inflation and the default probability and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) do not 
find a significant relation between inflation and credit risk at all. Rinaldi and Sanchis-
Arellano (2006) find a positive relation between inflation and non-performing loans 
but also mention that the relation is expected to be ambiguous. Unemployment has an 
unexpected negative relation with the credit loss changes which can be due to its high 
correlation with GDP and bankruptcies. However, it can also indicate that banks grant 
fewer loans because there are fewer people who are eligible for a loan. Consequently, 
the credit losses might decrease as the number of loans granted is decreased.  
The growing number of bankruptcies affects the most the probability that an extreme 
credit loss increase occurs. Typically, corporate loans are bigger than the loans of 
households and hence, the result is intuitive. If a company defaults, it is likely that 
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credit losses increase considerably. In addition, medium solvency banks are also more 
likely to face extreme credit loss decreases compared to low solvency banks.  
Bank size is an important determinant of credit loss changes. The results suggest that 
small banks suffer from greater increases in credit losses compared to medium and 
large banks. However, credit losses of medium and large banks are more sensitive to 
the changes in macroeconomic factors than credit losses of small banks. The possible 
explanation is that larger banks operate also in foreign countries and hence, are more 
exposed to economic fluctuations. Credit losses of commercial banks are also more 
sensitive to the changes in house prices and unemployment than credit losses of 
savings banks. In addition, commercial banks are less likely to face extreme credit loss 
decreases. These findings are consistent with prior empirical evidence by Salas and 
Saurina (2002)  who find that size and non-performing loans are negatively related in 
commercial banks and that commercial banks are more sensitive to economic cycles 
than savings banks. However, results suggest that credit losses of savings banks are 
more sensitive to the changes in the number bankruptcies. 
It is worth noting that the commercial banks dominate the sample, and this might affect 
the results. Thus, further research would be warranted in this respect and the research 
could be extended to other types of banks than only commercial and savings banks. I 
also use only the changes of macroeconomic variables lagged by one year. Hence, it 
would be interesting to examine whether the explanatory variables with more lags are 
better predictors of future credit loss changes and thus, would provide valuable 
information for the credit loss modelling. 
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APPENDICES 
The appendices show the descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables of 24 
European countries and for the bank-specific variables of 202 European banks for the 
sample period from 2005 to 2018.  
Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics for the first differences of macroeconomic variables. 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
GDP_1 2,814 0.01 0.03 -0.2 0.01 0.03 0.1 
IND_PROD_1 2,688 0.3 5.4 -23.0 -0.9 3.1 11.5 
INF_1 2,688 -0.04 1.1 -5.3 -0.4 0.7 4.0 
M1_1 1,120 5.8 3.7 -3.0 3.8 7.6 30.0 
HPRICE_1 2,559 2.2 6.3 -38.8 -1.3 5.7 24.8 
UNEMP_1 2,688 -0.01 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.04 0.5 
CON_1 2,716 -0.002 0.01 -0.1 -0.01 0.01 0.1 
INC_1 2,716 0.01 0.03 -0.2 0.002 0.03 0.2 
GFCF_1 2,716 0.01 0.1 -0.5 -0.01 0.05 0.3 
BANKR_1 2,050 0.03 0.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 1.3 
INDEBT_1 2,688 0.01 0.04 -0.1 -0.02 0.03 0.4 
STOXXE600_1 2,828 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.04 0.2 0.5 
DJIND_1 2,828 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.03 0.1 0.4 
NLIR_1 2,713 -0.2 1.1 -12.4 -0.7 0.2 8.4 
NSIR_1 2,709 -0.2 1.0 -5.3 -0.4 0.4 2.0 
RLIR_1 2,684 -0.3 2.0 -11.8 -1.1 0.6 11.5 
RSIR_1 2,678 -0.3 1.6 -7.2 -1.1 0.6 7.0 
TERM_1 2,702 -0.01 1.3 -12.1 -0.6 0.3 7.6 
EXP_1 2,716 0.04 0.1 -0.4 -0.005 0.1 0.4 
EXC_1 2,814 0.001 0.1 -0.2 -0.05 0.05 0.3 
N = number of observations, Mean = sample mean, St.Dev = standard deviation, Min = sample minimum, 
Pctl(25) = lower quartile, Pcrl(75) = upper quartile, Max = sample maximum. _1 refers to the lag by one year. 
CLs = log difference of  the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, GDP = log difference of real GDP, 
IND_PROD = absolute difference of industrial production, INF = absolute difference of inflation, M1 = 
absolute difference of narrow money, HPRICE = absolute difference of the house price index, UNEMP = log 
difference of harmonized unemployment rate, CON = log difference of household final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP, INC = log difference of net national disposable income, GFCF = log difference of 
gross fixed capital formation, BANKR = log difference of the number of bankruptcies measured by the index, 
INDEBT = log difference of the private sector debt-to-GDP, STOXXE600 = simple return of the STOXX 
Europe 600 index, DJIND = simple return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, NLIR = absolute 
difference of the nominal long-term interest rate, NSIR = absolute difference of the nominal short-term interest 
rate, RLIR = absolute difference of the real long-term interest rate, RSIR = absolute difference of the real short-
term interest rate, TERM = absolute difference of term spread defined as the nominal long-term interest rate 
minus the nominal short-term interest rate, EXP = log difference of exports of goods seasonally adjusted, EXC 
= log difference of the annual exchange rate measured as the national currency per US dollar. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for the bank-specific variables. 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
CLs 917 0.000 0.01 -0.1 -0.000 0.000 0.4 
INEF 1,820 11.1 86.7 -841.7 2.4 8.4 2,498.1 
LEV 2,140 0.9 0.8 0.002 0.9 0.9 34.2 
SOLV 2,140 0.1 0.8 -33.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 
SIZE 2,143 16.4 2.8 6.4 14.8 18.1 23.4 
PROF 2,139 4.4 202.8 -52.9 0.03 0.1 9,376.9 
SAV 2828 0.064 0.245 0 0 0 1 
COMM 2828 0.84 0.365 0 1 1 1 
N = number of observations, Mean = sample mean, St.Dev = standard deviation, Min = sample minimum, 
Pctl(25) = lower quartile, Pcrl(75) = upper quartile, Max = sample maximum. CLs = log difference of  the ratio 
of actual loan losses to total assets, INEF = operating expenses/Operating income, LEV = total liabilities / total 
assets, SOLV = total equity/total assets, SIZE = log of total assets, PROF = net income / total equity, SAV = 
savings bank, dummy variable, COMM = commercial bank, dummy variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
